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COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM AND HYDRAULIC
FRACTURING: A HUMAN RIGHT TO A
CLEAN ENVIRONMENT
Elizabeth Burleson*
This Article argues that filling the energy governance gaps regarding unconventional natural gas can best be accomplished through collaborative governance that is genuinely adaptive and cooperative.
Through cooperativefederalism, combined with proceduralrightsfor inclusive, innovative decision-making, state and non-state actors should
design and implement the requisite safeguards before further naturalgas
development advances.
Hydraulicfracturing provisions are strikinglyfragmented and have
sparked a fierce debate about chemical disclosure, radioactive wastewater disposal, and greenhouse gas emissions. United States naturalgas
production may stunt the direction and intensity of renewable energy by
up to two decades and will not provide a bridge to a sound energy policy
if it "erode[s] efforts to prepare a landing at the other end of the
bridge."' Unconventional natural gas extraction need not become a
transition to a new addiction. This Article analyzes how cooperativefederalism and inclusive decision-making can provide legitimacy and transparency when balancing property rights against police powers to
regulate natural gas production.
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INTRODUCTION

The complex dynamics of the energy debate continue to divide as
we transition from foreign fossil-fuel reliance to domestic water insecurity. Regulatory commons issues are not new, yet hydraulic fracturing
presents unique regulatory challenges in the wake of recent exemptions
to United States federal environmental law. Filling the regulatory gaps
governing unconventional natural gas is best accomplished through genuinely adaptive and collaborative governance. Inclusive cooperative federalism can facilitate identifying and implementing substantive energy
siting best-practices. This Article provides a framework for moving
from fragmentation towards iterative coordinated public regulation and
meaningful non-state actor involvement that does not illegitimately capture energy governance.
As hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling intensify, so do calls
for greater transparency and public participation in order to balance the
following three interdependent sustainability dimensions: environmental
protection, social equity, and economic stability. While media coverage
on hydrofracking fluid toxicity has raised public awareness, this Article
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contributes a new cooperative federalism and inclusive decision-making
(dynamic federalism) framework with which to fill the hydraulic fracturing governance gaps. In doing so, this Article highlights legitimacy and
transparency considerations when balancing property rights against police powers in order to operationalize the precautionary principle when
regulating unconventional natural gas.
The central focus of this Article is to sketch the contours of how
cooperative federalism, combined with procedural rights for inclusive
decision-making, can provide the requisite safeguards before further natural gas development advances.
Part I of this Article discusses unconventional natural gas in the
context of coordinating energy-water-climate governance.
Part II evaluates current federal regulatory limitations. Protecting
public health and environmental integrity depends upon greater regulation of hydraulic fracturing. The United States Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) provides rulemaking on how the flaring and leakage of
methane can begin the process of internalizing negative externalities.
Part III analyzes the suit against the federal government that called
for the federal government to conduct an environmental impact review of
hydraulic fracturing in the Delaware River Basin.
In contrast, Part IV assesses federal, local, and civil society critiques
of New York's revised environmental impact review.
Part V sets forth recommendations to strengthen energy-water-climate governance. This Article concludes that cooperative federalism and
inclusive decision-making can facilitate both a human right to a clean
environment and energy security.
I.

COORDINATING ENERGY-WATER-CLIMATE
COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE

This Article argues that filling the regulatory gaps governing unconventional natural gas can best be accomplished through collaborative
governance that is genuinely adaptive and cooperative. Through cooper-

ation at all levels of governance combined with procedural rights for inclusive decision-making, state and non-state actors should design and
implement the requisite safeguards before further natural gas development advances are made.
Hydraulic fracturing provisions are strikingly fragmented and have
sparked a fierce debate regarding chemical disclosure, radioactive wastewater disposal, and greenhouse gas emissions. Flaring natural gas flies
in the face of efforts to address climate change. The EPA's Natural Gas
STAR Program explains that natural gas extraction brings the greenhouse gas methane to the surface, where it is twenty-one times more
potent at trapping heat in the atmosphere over a one-hundred year period
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than carbon dioxide.2 An MIT study indicates that ramping up natural
gas may stunt renewable energy development by up to two decades. 3 As
the scope of carcinogenic, radioactive, and climate impacts of unconventional natural gas development become better known, public safety must
be addressed through health and environmental impact assessments.4
Public participation in early energy decision-making can help prevent
human rights violations that result when heavy industry is sited amidst
residential communities and within drinking watersheds.
Residents in Pennsylvania have learned that faulty well installation
can compromise potable water sources.5 While conventional gas is extracted from permeable reservoirs, unconventional gas can be reached
through fracturing rock formations. 6 A combination of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing has expanded access to unconventional gas
found in a range of formations, including shale, coalbeds, and sandstones.7 This Article will focus on unconventional natural gas development rather than the narrower hydraulic fracturing step of injecting
water, sand, and chemicals underground to release natural gas from
cracks in rocks.s The media has focused on the term hydraulic fracturing, preferring the shorthand "fracking." 9 Yet faulty cementing, wastewater, and a myriad of related concerns are as important as the specific
industrial practice of opening cracks in shale using high-pressure meth2 See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATURAL GAS STAR PROGRAM, http://www.epa.gov/

gasstar/basic-information/index.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2012).
3 See Jacoby et al., supra note 1, at 50.
4 See Owen L. Anderson, Subsurface "Trespass": A Man's Subsurface is Not His Castie, 49 WASHBURN L.J. 247, 282 (2010); see also John W. Broomes, Wrestling with a
Downhole Dilemma: Subsurface Trespass, Correlative Rights, and the Need for Hydraulic
Fracturingin Tight Reservoirs, 53 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 20-1, 20-13 (2007).
5 See David Biello, What the Frack? Natural Gas from Subterranean Shale Promises
U.S. Energy Independence- With Environmental Costs, Sci. AM., Mar. 30, 2010, http:/www.

scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=shale-gas-and-hydraulic-fracturing.
6 See id.

7 See id.
8 The given hydrofracking ratio depends on specific well conditions. See ENVIr. PRo.
AGENCY, DRAFzr PLAN TO STUDY THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF HYDRAULIC

FRACTURING ON

DRINKING WAT-ER RESOURCES 19 (2011), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/sab/sabproduct.

nsf/0/D3483AB445AE61418525775900603E79/$File/Draft+Plan+to+Study+the+Potential+
Impacts+of+Hydraulic+Fracturing+on+Drinking+Water+Resources-February+201 1.pdf [hereinafter EPA DRAFr STuDY PLAN].

9 The term hydraulic fracturing has come to mean different things to different stakeholders. To natural gas operators it refers to a very specific part of the natural gas production
process, while the general public has a wider interpretation encompassing the lifecycle of
natural gas extraction. The latter interpretation broadens the discussion to address negative
impacts that result from steps before and subsequent to the actual hydraulic fracturing stage of
opening fissures in a rock formation by blasting water, sand, and chemicals. For a broad
overview, see Hannah Wiseman, Untested Waters: The Rise of Hydraulic Fracturing in Oil
and Gas Production and the Need to Revisit Regulation, 20 FORDHAM ENvrL. L. REV. 115,

117 (2009).
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ods. In other words, public debate has only recently expanded to encompass not only hydraulic fracturing but also the entire unconventional
natural gas extraction process and its substantial challenges to public
health and environmental integrity.
Hydraulic fracturing involves injecting water, chemicals, and a
proppant, such as sand, to hold rock formation fractures open and release
trapped gas.)0 Slickwater hydraulic fracturing fluid often contains diesel,
formaldehyde, and acids from the outset and picks up heavy concentrations of salts, minerals, and radioactive materials from rock formations.' I
The 2010 documentary Gasland raised public concern over slickwater
and gas migration into surface and groundwater supplies.12 The Academy of Natural Sciences has found that drilling impacts watershed indicator species.' 3
Drilling operators say that the thousands of feet between hydraulic
fracturing operations and aquifers, combined with casing regulations and
the ratio of water to chemicals, adequately protect the environment.14 At
the same time, companies acknowledge that cement casing technology
needs to be developed further 5 and that Pennsylvania drillers have violated environmental regulations.' 6
Regulatory coordination is lacking with regard to unconventional
natural gas extraction and its health and environmental impacts. The
water intensity of hydraulic fracturing is particularly challenging. Both
water availability and quality issues are coming to the forefront as unconventional natural gas extraction expands. Unprecedented water withdrawals threaten aquatic habitat and overly rapid aquifer depletion.
Generally, flowback is treated (1) at publicly-owned sewage treatment
works (POTWs), raising radioactivity concerns,' 7 (2) injected into under10 See U.S. DEF'T OF ENERGY, MODERN SHALE GAs DE-VELOPMENT IN THE UNrrED
STATES: A PRIMER ES-4 (2009), available at http://www.netl.doe.gov/technologies/oil-gas/
publications/epreports/shale-gas-primer_2009.pdf.
11 See generally id.
12 See GASLAND (Int'l WOW Co. 2010), more information available at http://gaslandthemovie.com/about-the-film/synopsis.
13 See Press Release, Acad. of Natural Sciences, Marcellus Shale Needs Scientific Study
to Set Guidelines (Oct. 12, 2010), available at http://www.ansp.org/about/press-room/releases/
201 0/-/media/Files/ans/about/press/releases/20 I0/MarcellusShaleenvironmental-impact
10-10doc.ashx.
14 See generally William S. Friedlander, Poisoned Wells: Dangers ofNatural Gas Drilling, 47 TRIAL 16 (2011).

15 See generally id.
16 See generally id.; see also Press Release, Pa. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., DEP Takes Aggressive Action Against Cabot Oil & Gas Corp to Enforce Environmental Laws, Protect Public
in Susquehanna County (Apr. 15, 2010), available at http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portatl
server.pt/community/newsroom/14287?id=10586&typeid=1.
17 ENvrI.
DSGEIS

PROT. AGENCY,

FOR HoR1IO-AL

EPA COMMENTS ON REVISED DRAFI NYSDEC RiEVISED

DRILLING AN)

HIGH-VOi.UME

VELOP THE MARCELLUS SHALE AND OTHER Low-PERMEAHI

HYDRAULIC

FRACTURING To DE-

ITY GAs RESERVOIRs 2 (2012),
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ground injection wells, raising seismicity concerns, 18 and (3) stored in
onsite and central industrial facilities, raising leakage and long-term feasibility concerns. Spills, leaks, runoff, and improper construction, drilling, and disposal all intensify pollution levels. 19
Water treatment plants have been ill-prepared to treat the flowback
of hydraulic fracturing fluid, particularly given the naturally occurring
radium that flows back with the artificially added chemicals. 20 Water
treatment plants discharge into large rivers that in turn are relied upon for
drinking water. Radioactive contamination presents a regional public
health challenge. 2 1 It also illustrates the complexity of pinpointing liability when hydrofracking operators do not deliberately add radioactive
materials to hydraulic fracturing fluid. Environmental pollution governance generally suffers because of its compromised ability to isolate harm
caused by any given actor. A range of commercial and industrial facilities can adversely impact surface water and groundwater. 22 Industry use
of intellectual property law has further complicated the process of tracing
a contaminant back to a given source. Generally, operators have contended that they do not have to disclose the ratio of chemicals added to
hydrofracking fluids at any given site due to proprietary privileges under
trade secret provisions. 23 Well-resourced lobbying resulted in the dismantling of federal provisions that would have provided environmental
and human health thresholds.
Remaining federal regulatory capacity is fragmented. For instance,
the EPA's Mandatory Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program 24 encompasses methane and carbon dioxide emissions reporting for distributors
and facilities emitting over 25,000 metric tons of greenhouse gases annually. 2 5 Yet, the EPA has yet to require greenhouse gas emission reducavailable at http://www.epa.gov/region2/newsevents/pdf/EPA%20R2%2OComments%2ORevised%20dSGEIS%2OEnclosure.pdf [hereinafter EPA COMMENTS].
18 See 4.0 Earthquake Strikes in Northeast Ohio, USA TODAY, Dec. 31, 2011, http://

www.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2011-12-31 /northeast-ohio-earthquake/52307134/1
[hereinafter 4.0 Earthquake] ("Officials said Saturday they believe the latest earthquake activity in northeast Ohio is related to the injection of wastewater into the ground near a fault line,
creating enough pressure to cause seismic activity.").
19 EPA DRAFr1 STuDY PLAN, supra note 8, at 25.

20 See Mark A. Latham, The BP Deepwater Horizon: A Cautionary Tale for CCS,
Hydrofracking, Geoengineering and Other Emerging Technologies with Environmental and
Human Health Risks, 36 Wm. & MARY ENvmL. L. & Poi'Y Rrv. 31, 55 (2011).
21 See generally Ian Urbina, Regulation Lax as Gas Wells' Tainted Water Hits Rivers,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2011, at Al.

22 See David H. Getches, Groundwater Quality Protection: Setting a National Goalfor
State and FederalPrograms, 65 CHi.-KENT L. RE-v. 387, 409 (1989); see also Latham, supra
note 20, at 56.
23 See EPA DRAFr STUoY PLAN, supra note 8, at 25.
24 See generally 40 C.F.R. § 98 (2011).
25 See id. at § 98.2.
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tions through this program. 26 This program, combined with the EPA's
Tailoring Rule, 27 do not adequately incentivize greenhouse gas
mitigation.
In the context of drinking water, when wells lack proper casing and
cementing, stray gas can migrate from the wellbore into water supplies
and residences. A Duke University study found drinking water methane
concentrations to be seventeen times higher in active drilling and extraction areas than in non-active areas. 2 8 Few environmental or public health
advocates at present have a comprehensive understanding of gas engineering and law, state-specific mineral leasing requirements, or intellectual and other property law dimensions. Article I of the United States
Constitution empowers Congress to promote innovation by protecting
discoveries. 29 The federal government can also override patent protection to protect the public. 30 A profound lack of understanding regarding
the threat posed to water supplies by unconventional natural gas extraction presents a level of scientific uncertainty that justifies precaution.
A.

United States Pioneering Collaborative Governance

Uma Outka has analyzed the environmental justice implications
of the National Environmental Policy Act's (NEPA)3 1 structural
26 See id. § 98.1.
27 The list includes carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride. See ENvrL. PROT. AGENCY, FINAL RuLE: PREVENTION
OF SIGNIFICANT DETERIORATION AND TITLE V GREENHOUSE GAS TAILORING RULE (2010),

availableat http://www.epa.gov/NSR/documents/20100413fs.pdf.
28 See Stephen G. Osborn et al., Methane Contaminationof Drinking Water Accompanying Gas-Well Drilling and Hydraulic Fracturing, 108 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. Sa. 8172, 8173

(2011), available at http://www.nicholas.duke.edu/cgc/pnas2011.pdf.
29 Congress is empowered to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries." U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (the "Copyright Clause").
30 28 U.S.C § 1498 (2011); see generally Elizabeth Burleson & Winslow Burleson, Innovation Cooperation:Energy Biosciences and Law, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 651 (2011).
31 See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (2006)); see also N.Y. v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng'rs, No. 11-CV-2599, 11-CV-3857, 11-CV-3780, 2012 U.S. App. WL 4336701, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2012) ("NEPA has 'twin aims': it imposes on federal agencies 'the obligation to consider every significant aspect of the environmental impact of a proposed action,'
and it 'ensures that the agency will inform the public that it has indeed considered environmental concerns in its decision-making process.' Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res.
Def Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983). A federal agency must prepare what is called an
environmental impact statement ('EIS') to accompany a federal action, which includes
'projects and programs entirely or partly financed, assisted, conducted, regulated, or approved
by federal agencies; [and] new or revised agency rules, regulations, plans, policies, or procedures.' 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18(a). An EIS should include '(i) the environmental impact of the
proposed action, (ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the
proposal be implemented, (iii) alternatives to the proposed action, (iv) the relationship between
local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of longterm productivity, and (v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which
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gaps. 32 According to the EPA:
Environmental Justice is the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color,
national origin, or income with respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies. EPA has this goal for
all communities and persons across this Nation. It will
be achieved when everyone enjoys the same degree of
protection from environmental and health hazards and
equal access to the decision-making process to have a
healthy environment in which to live, learn, and work.3 3
President Clinton's 1994 Executive Order on "Environmental Justice in
Minority and Low-Income Populations" paved the way for federal agencies to identify and address health and environmental impacts on environmental justice. 34 The Order did not set forth a private cause of action,
would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.' 42 U.S.C.

§ 4332(C)(i)-

(v.").

32 Luke Cole, Robert Kuehn, Clifford Rechtschaffen, and Maria Ramfrez Fisher have
provided crucial United States environmental justice critiques, while Svitlana Kravchenko,
John Bonine, Nick Robinson, Dina Shelton, Don Anton, Marcos Orellana, James May, and
Erin Daly are among the pioneer scholars analyzing international and comparative human
ights and the environment. See Uma Outka, NEPA and EnvironmentalJustice: Integration,
Implementation, and JudicialReview, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 601, 601 (2006); see also
DONALD ANTON

&

DINAH

SHELTON,

ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION

(2011); LUKE W. COLE & SHEILA R. FoSTER, FROM THE GROUND

UP:

AND HUMAN RIGHTS
ENVIRONMENTAL RA-

CISM AND THE RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTALI JUSTICE MOVEMENT (2001); ERIN DALY & JAMES
MAY, CONITEMPORARY PRINCIPLES IN CONsTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (ELI/ABA
2011); SVITLANA KRAVCHENKO & JOHN E. BONINE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT:
CASES, LAW, AND POLICY 261 (1st ed. 2008); ORELLANA & JOHL, CTR. FOR INT'L ENVTL.
LAW, CLIMATE CHANGE AND) HUMAN RIGHTs: A PRIMER (May 2011); NICHOLAS A. RoINSON
& LAL KURUKULASURIYA, U.N. ENV'T PROGRAMME, TRAINING MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2006); Elizabeth Burleson & Diana Pei Wu, Collaborative Commu-

nity-Based Natural Resource Management, 21 FORDHAM ENVTI. L. REV. 201 (2010); Elizabeth Burleson, Making Sand Castles as the Tide Comes In: Legal Aspects of Climate Justice, 2
J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 42 (2011); Marfa Ramfrez Fisher, On the Road from Environmental
Racism to Environmental Justice, 5 VILL. ENV rt. L.J. 449, 449-52 (1994); Robert R. Kuehn,
A Taxonomy of Environmental Justice, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10681, 10681 (2000); Clifford
Rechtschaffen, Advancing Environmental Justice Norms, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 95, 96
(2003); Nicholas A. Robinson, International Trends in Environmental Impact Assessment
(1991 Bellagio Conference on U.S.-USSR Environmental Protection Institutions), 19 B.C.
ENVTI. AiF. L. REV. 591 (1992); Gerald Torres, Introduction: Understanding Environmental
Racism, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 839, 839-40 (1992).
33 ENVIL. PROT. AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAI

JUSTICE HOME, http://www.epa.gov/compli-

ance/environmentaljustice/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2012).

34 See Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and
Low-Income Populations, Exec. Order No. 12898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994) (mandating that each federal agency make "environmental justice part of its mission by identifying and
addressing, as appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental
effects of its programs, policies, and activities on minority populations and low-income populations"), amended by Exec. Order No. 12948, 60 Fed. Reg. 6381 (Jan. 30, 1995); see also
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but did task federal agencies with the mission of integrating environmental justice into their activities. 35 Public participation is a core aspect of
environmental justice and has been required of federal agencies by
NEPA. 36
NEPA requires federal agencies to write an environmental impact
statement for "major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of
the human environment,"3 7 including: issuing federal permits, establishing government policies/regulations, undertaking/authorizing federal
projects, and activities potentially subject to federal control and responsibility.3 8 Conducting environmental assessments39 enables federal agencies to decide whether to go on to an entire environmental impact
statement based on "'a reasonably close causal relationship"' between
the environmental effect and the alleged cause. 40 Alternatively, a federal
agency can declare a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) and end
environmental review. 4 1
A crucial provision in NEPA relates to timeframe. Federal agencies
are to conduct their environmental review "at the earliest possible time"
in a given planning process. This is central to awareness regarding adverse environmental impacts and potential alternatives genuinely informing decision-making. 4 2
The environmental impact statement process requires a reasonable
alternatives analysis that includes seriously considering no action. 4 3 It
also encompasses consideration of direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts that affect health, environmental, social, and economic resources.44
Omar Saleem, Overcoming Environmental Discrimination: The Need for a Disparate Impact
Test and Improved Notice Requirements in Facility Siting Decisions, 19 CoLum. J. ENVTI. L.

211, 213-22 (1994).
35 Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and LowIncome Populations, Exec. Order No. 12898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. I1, 1994).
36 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (2000); ExEc. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, COUNCIL ON
ENvrL. QUALITY, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PouIcy AcT: A S-iuoy OF ITs EFFECTlvE-

NEss AVrER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS 1-2 (1997), available at http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/nepa/
nepa25fn.pdf [hereinafter COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALrIY]; see also ENvrL. PROT. AGENCY,
FINAL GUIDANCE FOR INCORPORATING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE CONCERNS IN EPA's NEPA
COMPLIANCE ANALYSES § 1.0 (1998), available at http://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/

resources/policy/ej-guidance-nepaepa0498.pdf [hereinafter EPA GUIDANCE]; see generally
ENVIt. PROT. AGENCY, REGION 4: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, http://www.epa.gov/region4/ej/

resources.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2012).
37 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2000).
38 See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (2005).
39 See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.3.
40 Dep't of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 754 (2004) (quoting Metro. Edison
Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 774 (1983)); see 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27.
41 See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4.
42 See id. § 1501.2.
43 See id. § 1502.14.
44 See id. §§ 1508.8, 1508.14, 1508.25.
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Once a draft environmental impact statement has been completed,
NEPA requires the agency to solicit and respond in a specific and affirmative manner to potentially affected individuals as well as relevant federal, state, and local agencies. 45 Furthermore, NEPA facilitates inclusive
decision-making by requiring the agency to involve the public. In doing
so, NEPA calls for public disclosure of comments and underlying documents, notification, and public meetings. 46 NEPA requires federal agencies to include their responses to public comments in their final
environmental impact statement. 47 None of these requirements holds an
agency to the most environmentally favorable option, 4 8 yet NEPA does
set forth procedural measures to ensure informed decision-making. Environmental impacts may not prevent an action, but actions should not
commence without adequate understanding of environmental consequences. 4 9 Thus, NEPA places environmental analysis squarely on the
agenda of federal decision-making and facilitates access to information
and public participation. 50
The Council on Environmental Quality Guidance calls upon federal
agencies to recognize factors that may amplify adverse environmental
impacts for certain communities and strategize ways to surmount barriers
to meaningful participation by a broad array of stakeholders.5 ' I argue
that a crucial environmental justice decision conducted by federal agencies involves determining whether to conduct a full environmental impact statement for a proposed action. 52 Generally, NEPA reviews are
done via preliminary environmental assessments, not a full environmental impact statement. 53
It is important to note that NEPA regulations call on agencies to
involve the public in preparing environmental assessments yet also be
mindful of the reality that NEPA only requires public participation with
regard to notice and comment provisions for a draft environmental impact statement.5 4 In other words, civil society participation in inclusive
environmental decision-making rests on the determination of significant
§ 1503.1.
§ 1506.6.
id. §§ 1502.9, 1505.2.
id. § 1505.2.
id. § 1500.1(c).
id. §§ 1500.1(c), 1506.6.

45 See id.
46 See id.
47 See
48 See
49 See
50 See

51 COUNCIL ON ENVrT. QUALITY, supra note 36, at 8-9; Outka, supra note 32, at 612

(citing Anchorage v. United States, 980 F.2d 1320, 1328 (9th Cir. 1992); Webb v. Gorsuch,
699 F.2d 157, 159-60 (4th Cir. 1983)).
52 See COLE & FOSMR, supra note 32, at 196-97.
53 See Stephen M. Johnson, NEPA and SEPA's in the Questfor Environmental Justice,
30 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 565, 570 (1997).
54 See 40 C.F.R. § 1506.6(a) (2005).
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environmental impact.5 5 I argue that the federal agency has to be conscientious enough on its own to recognize substantial environmental impacts before NEPA requires the agency to engage with the general public
to identify ramifications and alternatives.
B.

Balancing Equity and Efficiency in Collaborative Governance

In a related forthcoming article, I explore how dynamic network
governance can engage relevant actors in (1) information gathering/sharing, (2) inclusive decision-making, and (3) community-driven implementation. This global legal pluralism argument weaves together ethics,
economics and environmental law to offer dynamic network governance
theory as an overarching approach. 56 Economic market failures, socially
inequitable resource access, and governance inertia to sustain environmental integrity can be addressed in the aggregate through dynamic governance collective action to complement discrete efforts underway at
multiple levels of governance. It argues that norm building that occurs
through these networks enhances inclusive/deliberative decision-making
and socially-grounded implementation. Here, I focus on the qualitative
case study of how inclusive cooperative governance can help close unconventional natural gas extraction governance gaps.
Sean Nolon has considered notions of equity, cultural perception of
risk, and attribution of causes in the context of energy siting. He explains that discounting civil society involvement as costly and time-consuming misses several important points of governance. For instance,
siting decisions often "impose significant, uncompensated burdens on
communities" 57 and collaborative governance5 8 can enhance sustainable
development. Process can profoundly impact outcome. Nelson
Mandela's inviting a powerful Afrikaans resistance group leader into his
home enhanced reconciliation and capacity for cooperative South African governance. In the context of environmental justice, such trust
building is important.59 Calling for people to care, openly and for the
long-term, Elisabeth Radow explains that, "[p]ublic participation
processes in which the dialogue manifests in open communication, collaborative interaction and transformed individual perspectives results in a
55 See EPA GUIDANCE, supra note 36, §§ 1.0, 4.1.
56 Elizabeth Burleson, Dynamic Network Governance, - Gieo. INT'L ENvrt. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2013).
57 Sean F. Nolon, Negotiating the Wind: A Framework to Engage Citizens in Siting Wind
Turbines, 12 CARDOZO J. CONIMICr REsoi.. 327, 331 (2011) (noting that "successful citizen
involvement is more than a statement of principle-it must be implemented following the best
practices of consensus building and collaboration.").
58 See Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA
L. Rnv. 1, 13 (1997).
59 See Nolon supra note 57, at 331.
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greater likelihood of reasoned outcomes, which ultimately account for
the common and varied interests of all involved parties." 60
In the vacuum of regulation, civil society organizing has included
sharing information via the Internet and public forums. Good governance involves inclusive decision-making at the outset, when public participation can inform a precautionary approach 6 1 to energy policy, rather
than after-the-fact dispute resolution.
From Tunisia, 62 to Egypt, 6 3 to the United States, 64 ordinary individuals have gathered to express collective desperation. High cost of living,
corruption, and unemployment drive resistance. 65 Kurt Andersen argues
that "democracy is difficult and sometimes a little scary. Because deciding what you don't want is a lot easier than deciding and implementing
what you do want, and once everybody has a say, everybody has a
say."6 6 This is an unpredictable process. Inclusive decision-making provides a best practice that can avert social unrest and balance sustainable
development.
Informed, inclusive decision-making may locate sensible places to
extract natural gas that do not compromise public health and environmental integrity. Some communities are in a position to determine
whether gas production should occur, while many communities find
themselves already contending with natural gas production and seek inclusive decision-making forums to identify best practices. 67
While the ingredients of good governance are well known, implementing transparency and inclusive decision-making in the context of
energy siting remains challenging. The EPA explains that:
Environmental justice is the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color,
national origin, or income with respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of environmen60 Elisabeth N. Radow, Citizen David Tames Gas Goliathson the MarcellusShale Stage:
Citizen Action as a Form of Dispute Prevention in the Internet Age, 12 CARoo J. CoNMcr

RieSOL. 373, 395 (2011) ("The decision-making process occurs over time in an evolving international landscape regarding the boom or bust economic forecast of the drilling investment
itself, growing numbers of incidents of environmental and human catastrophes, states and private parties in growing need of revenue and the resulting politics.").
61 See Daniel Bodansky, Scientific Uncertainty and the PrecautionaryPrinciple, ENv'r,

Sept. 1991, at 4.
62 Kurt Andersen, The Protester, TIMu, Dec. 26, 2011, at 54, 70, available at http://

www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2-101745_2102132_2102373,00.html.
63 See id. at 58. Regime-changing protests were sparked by fraudulent elections. See id.
At least 4.5 million Egyptians protested. Id. at 70.
64 See id. at 58.
65 See id. at 72.

66 Id. at 78 (emphasis in original).
67 See Radow, supra note 60, at 390.
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tal laws, regulations, and policies. Achieving
environmental justice is an Agency-wide priority
(USEPA, 2010d), and is therefore considered in this
study plan. There are concerns that hydraulic fracturing
may adversely affect some communities that may be
more likely to be exposed to harmful chemical contaminants as a result of fracturing activities, particularly
through contaminated drinking water resources. Stakeholders have raised concerns about the environmental
justice implications of gas drilling operations, noting that
people with a lower socioeconomic status may be more
likely to consent to drilling arrangements because they
may not have the resources to engage with policymakers
and agencies to affect alternatives. Additionally, drilling
agreements are between landowners and well operators,
implying that tenants and neighbors may have little or no
input in the decision-making process.68
It is difficult to reach the environmental justice elements of rights of
access to information and public participation when federal agencies issue FONSIs without involving civil society. 6 9 When, and if, a federal
agency decides to prepare an environmental impact statement, the Council on Environmental Quality regulations calls for notice of intent to be
published in the Federal Register.70 Public participation measures kick
in at this stage as agencies affirmatively request responses to a draft environmental impact statement.7 1 Unfortunately, such public participation
is solicited well into the decision-making process and only if an environmental impact statement is conducted. 72 Furthermore, institutional momentum tends to propel federal agencies toward completing the federal
action rather than putting on the brakes and calling for no action. Thus,
the earliest stages of decision-making are a far more sensible stage at
which to genuinely involve impacted stakeholders and seriously consider
no action as a viable option.
Enhancing federal environmental law's access to information, public participation, and access to justice provisions can overcome the substantial barriers to environmental justice encountered given NEPA's
limited structure and timing of public participation measures. 73 Making
initial outreach more robust at the earliest preliminary environmental as68 EPA DRAwr SUDY PLAN, supra note 8, at 49.
69 See COLE & FOSTER, supra note 32, at 111.

70 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7 (2005).
71 Id. § 1503.1(a)(4).
72 See EPA GUIDANCE, supra

note

36,

§ 4.1;

COLE & FOSTER, supra note 32, at 111.

73 See COLE & FOSTER, supra note 32, at 111.
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sessment stage can avert the perception of civil society being "appeased
rather than an actual part of the decisionmaking process." 74
Actions pursuant to the Clean Air Act7 5 may not be required to implement NEPA's full public participation measures. This leaves access
to information and public participation unpredictable. 76 Cooperative federalism has led to curtailed NEPA scope when states administer the
Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act,77 and the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA). 78 State action under these statutes may not be
federal action pursuant to NEPA. 79 The EPA review also may not trigger NEPA.s 0 Yet many states have little NEPAs, or SEPAs, that include
environmental justice provisions. Actions that trigger neither NEPA nor
SEPA requirements for inclusive decision-making continue to result in
unsustainable development.'
Procedural rights to inclusive decision-making should not be set
aside under "functional equivalent" provisions on the grounds that other
statutes are more specialized, and, thus, NEPA review would be redundant.8 2 Stephen Johnson argues that NEPA functionally equivalent measures should be enhanced to require substantially equivalent public
participation and other environmental justice factors.8 3
While NEPA does not include a citizen suit provision, private enforcement of NEPA provisions may be pursued under the Administrative
Procedure Act's (APA) 84 general private right of action for judicial review of final agency actions.8 5 Such APA review can include agency
action that is unreasonably delayed, arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of
discretion.8 6 Reviewing courts will defer to agency actions, given the
agency's area of discretion, 7 if the agency "has considered the relevant
74 See Outka, supra note 32, at 610.
75 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (2000).
76 See EPA GUIDANCE, supra note 36,

77

§ 1.2.1.

33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (2011); see also Elizabeth Burleson, Tribal, State, and Federal Cooperation to Achieve Good Governance, 40 AKRON L. Rv. 207 (2007) (analyzing
federal, state, and tribal cooperative good governance pursuant to the Clean Water Act).
78 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq. (2000).
79 See Johnson, supra note 53, at 595 n.126.
80 Id.
81 See id. at 568-69.
82 See Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 489 F.2d 1247, 1256 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
83 See Johnson, supra note 53, at 596.
84 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704 (2000).
85 Id.
86 Id. § 706.
87 See Dep't of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 763 (2004); Balt. Gas & Elec. Co.
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 105-06 (1983); Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427
U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976).
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factors and articulated a rational connection between the facts found and
the choice made." 8 8

The United States pioneered inclusive federal legislation that could
enhance informed decision-making. The National Environmental Policy
Act, the Freedom of Information Act, the Administrative Procedure Act,
and the Toxic Release Inventory provide a framework for transparent,
inclusive govemance.8 9 This US approach remains nascent, and this Article offers a comparative legal analysis with which to optimize inclusive
environmental decision-making among state and non-state actors.

II. EPA

STUDY ON HYDRAULIC FRACTURING AND WATER

Congress has directed the EPA to examine the relationship between
hydraulic fracturing and drinking water resources. 90 Congress approved
$1.9 million for the EPA to re-open its 2004 hydraulic fracturing study,
using independent sources of information, best available science, and a
transparent peer-reviewed process. 9 1 The EPA is researching all stages
of the hydraulic fracturing water lifecycle, based on case studies and generalized scenario evaluations. 92 The EPA anticipates releasing an interim
report in 2012 and a final report in 2014.93

88 Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 462 U.S. at 105 (internal citations omitted).
89 See Nolon, supra note 57, at 355; see also Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Collaborative
Governance: Emerging Practices and the Incomplete Legal Frameworkfor Public and Stakeholder Voice, J. Disp. RESOL. 269, 273-77 (2009) (discussing the scope of Freeman's term

"Collaborative Governance," ranging from negotiated rulemaking to broader collaborative participatory planning, negotiation, and mediation).
90 EPA DRAFr STuDv PLAN, supra note 8, at 1; see also ENVrT. PROT. AGENCY, SCIENCE
IN ACTION: BUILDING A SCIENTIFIC FOUNDATION FOR SOUND ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS:

HY-

DRAULIC FRACTURING RESEARCH Sruoy 2 (2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/safewater/
uic/pdfs/hfresearchstudyfs.pdf ("Potential risks to surface and underground sources of drinking
water might occur at various points in the hydraulic fracturing process. The likelihood of
those risks causing drinking water contamination will be evaluated during the EPA hydraulic
fracturing study. Contaminants of concern to drinking water include fracturing fluid chemicals
and degradation products and naturally occurring materials in the geologic formation (e.g.
metals, radionuclides) that are mobilized and brought to the surface during the hydraulic fracturing process.").
91 H.R. REP. No. 111-316, at 109 (2010) (Conf. Rep.), available at http://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/CRPT-I1 lhrpt3l6/pdf/CRPT-1 1lhrpt316.pdf.
92 EPA DRAF STUDY PLAN, supra note 8, at 50.

93 Id. at 51. EPA's promised wastewater treatment standards for flowback will not be in
place until 2014 at the earliest. See Press Release, Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Announces
Schedule to Develop Natural Gas Wastewater Standards/Announcement Is Part of Administration's Priority to Ensure Natural Gas Development Continues Safely and Responsibly (Oct. 20,
2011), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/bd4379a92ceceeac8525735900
400c27/9le7fadb4bl l4c4a8525792f00542001!OpenDocument [hereinafter Schedule to
Develop].
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EPA Efforts to Enhance Public Participation

To its credit, the EPA has committed to involving stakeholders and
working with independent experts. Federal, state, and tribal partner consultations have focused on the study's scope, gaps in information, and
ways to share data and conduct joint studies. 94 The EPA also held a
series of sector-specific webinars, which were online, real-time, interactive forums that allowed participants to ask questions.95 These forums
have brought the EPA together with representatives from industry and
non-governmental organizations to work on effective public engagement
and information sharing. 96
Hydrofracking impacts on drinking water have galvanized strong
responses by the general public to date. Thousands of people are participating in informational meetings where the EPA has solicited answers to
fill EPA information gaps and set priorities. 9 7
While its transdisciplinary process to integrate analysis from inside
and outside the EPA has taken a narrow slice of the unconventional natural gas picture, the EPA is seeking to address environmental justice. 98
The EPA notes that:
[t]here are concerns that hydraulic fracturing may adversely affect some communities that may be more
likely to be exposed to harmful chemical contaminants
as a result of fracturing activities, particularly through
contaminated drinking water resources. Stakeholders
have raised concerns about the environmental justice implications of gas drilling operations, noting that people
with a lower socioeconomic status may be more likely to
consent to drilling arrangements because they may not
have the resources to engage with policymakers and
agencies to affect alternatives. Additionally, drilling
agreements are between landowners and well operators,
implying that tenants and neighbors may have little or no
input in the decision-making process. To address these
94 EPA DRAr STUDY PLAN, supra note 8, at 3 ("The federal partners included the Bureau of Land Management, the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service, the U.S. Forest Service, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers (USACE), the National Park Service (NPS), and the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry.").
95 ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, WHr'S A WEBINAR?, http://www.epa.gov/webtraining/whatsawebinar.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2012).
96 EPA DRAFUr

DY PLAN, supra note 8, at 3 ("Public information meetings were held

between July and September, 2010, in Fort Worth, Texas; Denver, Colorado; Canonsburg,
Pennsylvania; and Binghamton, New York.").
97 Id. at 3-4.

98 Id. at 15, 49-50.
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concerns, EPA will combine the data collected on the
location of well sites within the United States with demographic information (e.g., income and race) to screen
whether hydraulic fracturing disproportionately impacts
some citizens and to identify areas for further study. 99
While studying health and environmental impacts should not take the
place of effectively enforcing strict regulations, the EPA is providing a
collaborative governance best practice by involving civil society in its
evaluation of hydraulic fracturing impacts on drinking water. This is being done by strengthening the following two core environmental justice
components: (1) access to information and (2) public participation. 00
B.

Substantive Limitations of FederalNatural Gas Oversight

In 2010, the EPA published a list of publicly known chemicals used
in hydrofracking.o'0 The EPA requested voluntary disclosures, yet the
EPA admits that its list is incomplete with regard to the full list of chemicals as well as the concentrations and frequency of chemical use. The
EPA favors the term "release" which it uses to refer to a leak, spill, or
release.10 2 In early 2011, Congressmen Waxman brought to light that
diesel, and thus benzene, had been used in hydrofracking operations in
nineteen states from 2005 to 2009-heightening public outcry over the
identity and toxicity of hydrofracking chemicals. 0 3 The Chairman of the
Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, Henry Waxman, and Sub-

committee Chairman, Edward Markey, requested information on fracturing chemicals from eight natural gas companies."M The companies were
not forthright in responding to these congressional requests. 05
99 Id. at 49-50 ("Environmental justice is the fair treatment and meaningful involvement
of all people regardless of race, color, national origin, or income with respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies.").
100 Garrick B. Pursley & Hannah J. Wiseman, Local Energy, 60 EMORY L.J. 877, 931-32
(2011) (citing William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the
Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. Riy. 1547, 1565-66 (2007)); see also Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 Nw. U. L. Rinv. 1097, 1102-03 (2009);
Kirsten Engel, State and Local Climate Change Initiatives: What Is Motivating State and Local Governments to Address a Global Problem and What Does This Say About Federalismand
Environmental Law?, 38 URn. LAW. 1015, 1021 (2006).
101 EPA DRAFr Suov PLAN, supra note 8, at 25.
102 See id.
103 See id.

104 Press Release, Comm. on Energy & Commerce, Energy & Commerce Committee Investigates Potential Impacts of Hydraulic Fracturing (Feb. 18, 2010), available at http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/index.php?q=news/energy-commerce-committeeinvestigates-potential-impacts-of-hydraulic-fracturing; see also Letter from Rep. Henry A.
Waxman, Chairman, Comm. on Energy and Commerce, to Ten Oil and Gas Companies (July
19, 2010), available at http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/documents/20100719/
Letters.Hydraulic.Fracturing.07.19.2010.pdf [hereinafter Letter from Waxman].
105 See Letter from Waxman, supra note 104.
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Given the following EPA identified risks associated with
hydrofracking, the scope and timeframe of the EPA study warrant serious criticism:
[l]arge hydraulic fracturing operations require extensive
quantities of supplies, equipment, water, and vehicles,
which could create risks of accidental releases, such as
spills or leaks. Surface spills or releases can occur as a
result of tank ruptures, equipment or surface impoundment failures, overfills, vandalism, accidents, ground
fires, or improper operations. Released fluids might
flow into a nearby surface water body or infiltrate into
the soil and near-surface ground water, potentially reaching drinking water aquifers . . . .106
The year 2014 is too distant a timeframe for the EPA to determine the
"toxic and human health effects associated with hydraulic fracturing
fluid chemical additives." 0 7 Further, to depend on voluntary disclosures
from hydraulic fracturing companies and scientific literature reviews of
surface chemical spills does not strike this author as sensible given the
option to require toxic disclosures and enforce robust environmental
laws.
The EPA study does not primarily focus on air pollution from unconventional natural gas extraction, forgoing the opportunity to better
understand the greenhouse gas emissions and other air quality impacts of
ramping up drilling. Yet, the EPA recognizes that one of the most substantial pollution concerns with regard to hydrofracking is "off-gassing
of methane from flowback before [a] well is put into production. The
NYS DSGEIS estimated that 10,200 mcf of methane is off gassed per
well. 108 Furthermore, the EPA highlights known reduced emissions
completion methods that can prevent ninety percent of the methane from
being released into the atmosphere and further destabilizing the climate.' 0 9 At a local level, such methane concentrations can and do cause
explosions, and volatile organic compounds (VOCs) emitted from unconventional natural gas extraction include benzene and other carcinogens.110 While the EPA's September 2012 final rule to amend new
source performance standards for petroleum refinery process heaters and
flaring systems will induce refineries to capture the $79 million predicted

106 EPA DRAFI Soruvn PLAN, supra note 8, at 25.
107 See id. at 53.
108 Id. at 55.
109 See id.
1 10 See id. at 36, 55.
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savings," information is lacking on the scope of this rule for natural gas
extraction generally, and on air pollution factors as straightforward as
transport exhaust from heavy-duty diesel trucks. The National Park Service projects that truck traffic throughout the Marcellus Shale will substantially elevate nitrogen oxides levels. 112 The scope and timeframe of
the EPA study does not appear to be in keeping with the precautionary
principle given the continued use of the drinking water supplies in question by the general public in the meantime. 13 The public sector appears
to be taking civil society through an experiment with the hopes that natural gas revenue will offset adverse health and environmental integrity. 114
It strikes this author as an inadequate scope to focus narrowly on hydraulic fracturing and drinking water rather than the broader array of adverse
impacts that result from natural gas development.
Hydrofracking became economical by carving out responsibility for
such negative externalities as water pollution. Other factors include rising fossil fuel prices as well as technological advances in drilling horizontally using high-pressure hydraulic fracturing. The oil and gas
industry successfully lobbied for exemptions for hydrofracking from several major federal environmental laws, many of which went into effect
with the enactment of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct)."1 5 EPAct
exempted many activities associated with hydraulic fracturing from existing federal governance. In particular, industry lobbying succeeded in
removing hydraulic fracturing from federal drinking water measures.' 16
This has come to be known as the EPAct "Halliburton Loophole" to the
111 See Standards of Performance for Petroleum Refineries; Standards of Performance for
Petroleum Refineries for Which Construction, Reconstruction, or Modification Commenced
After May 14, 2007, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,422, 56,425 (Sept. 12, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pts. 9, 60), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-09-12/pdf/2012-20866.pdf.
112 EPA DRAFT STrUDY PLAN, supra note 8, at 55.
113 See Elisabeth Rosenthal, I Disclose . .. Nothing, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 21, 2012, at SRI,

available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/22/sunday-review/hard-truths-about-disclosure.
html?scp=1&sq=elizabeth%20rosenthal&st=cse (noting that, "[i]f recent history serves as a
guide, disclosure laws-meant to elucidate-do not necessarily lead to greater transparency or
prevent the things they were meant to deter. Every holder of a subprime mortgage that is now
underwater once signed an elaborate disclosure statement required by the Truth in Lending Act
describing precisely the risky terms of their loan. Likewise, 'super PACs' in the presidential
campaign are technically compliant with financial disclosure laws, but have so far proved
successful at hiding many of the sources of their money.").
114 See, e.g., Jeffrey v. Ryan, No. CA2012-001254 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 2, 2012) (finding
no dire need since the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation has yet to
publish new regulations); see also Gerald B. Silverman, New York State Court Strikes Down
Local Law Banning Hydraulic Fracking, BNA, Oct. 3, 2012, http://news.bna.com/deln/
DELNWB/split-display.adp?fedfid=28322846&vname=dennotallissues&jd=aOd4x8k9e4&
split=0 ("New York court rules that Binghamton's temporary ban on fracking was not a properly enacted moratorium.").
1 15 See Energy Policy Act of 2005 § 318, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15801 (2005).
116 See id § 322, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15801.
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Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA). 1 17 Oil and gas drilling activities
were generally exempt from the Clean Air Act (CAA);" 8 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA, commonly known as "Superfund");11 9 and Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act.120 These statutes may still cover aspects of oil and
gas processing.1 2 1 Hannah Wiseman has discussed the manner in which
Congress has exempted many hydraulic fracturing activities from federal
provisions.12 2 Fragmented federal provisions still address limited unconventional natural gas development under such statutes as the CWA,
SDWA, NEPA, Endangered Species Act (ESA),1 23 Clean Air Act, Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA),1 24 and
CERCLA.
In the vacuum of federal governance, jurisdictions and stakeholders
have brought suits against one another to act or refrain from acting to
regulate unconventional natural gas extraction. 125 Hydraulic fracturing
bans passed by local communities are being challenged by states on preemption grounds.126 The New York Attorney General's National Envi117 See 42
118 See 42
119 See 42
120 See 42

U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.

§
§
§
§

300(f) et seq. (2010).
7401 et seq. (1977).
9601 et seq. (2010).
6901 et seq.

121 ENVTI.. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATION OF OIL AND GAS CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES,
http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/stormwater/oilgas.cfm (last visited Sept. 25, 2012).
122 See Hannah Wiseman, Untested Waters: The Rise of Hydraulic Fracturingin Oil and
Gas Production and the Need To Revisit Regulation, 20 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 115, 117
(2009) (noting that "Congress' exemption of fracing [sic] from the Safe Drinking Water Act
involved two types of regulatory failure"); Hannah Wiseman, Regulatory Adaptation in Fractured Appalachia, 21 VILL. ENVrT. L.J. 229, 250-51 n.125 (2010) (listing and explaining
exceptions); see also Emily C. Powers, Fracking and Federalism:Support for an Adaptive
Approach that Avoids the Tragedy of the Regulatory Commons, 19 J.L. & POL'Y 913, 938-39
(2011) (citing Energy Policy Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. § 15801 (2005) (exempting hydraulic
fracturing processes from the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300(f) et seq. (2010))).
The EPAct also altered how portions of the following Acts are applied to hydrofracking, resulting in de facto exemptions: Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. (2010); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et
seq. (2010); National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq.
(2010); Clean Air Act of 1977, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (1977); Emergency Planning and
Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 11004 et seq. (2010).
123 See 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq. (2011).
124 42 U.S.C. §§ 11004-49.
125 See generally ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, HYDRAULIC FRACTURING CASE CHART (2012),

available at http://www.amoldporter.com/resources/documents/Hydraulic%20Fracturing%20
Case%20Chart.pdf.
126 See, e.g., Ne. Natural Energy, LLC v. Morgantown, No. 11 C-411, 2011 WL
3584376, at *7-8 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. 2011) (the Monongalia County Circuit Court rejected Morgantown, WV City Council's home rule argument for passing an ordinance banning hydraulic
fracturing, stating "[t]he doctrine of preemption is applicable law when the State has assumed
control of a particular subject of regulation, and a local government has enacted an ordinance
in the same field"); see also Marie C. Baca, Pittsburgh Bans Natural Gas Drilling, PROPUILICA (Nov. 16, 2010, 4:49 PM), http://www.propublica.org/article/pittsburgh-bans-natural-gas-
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ronmental Policy Act case requesting an environmental impact
assessment was dismissed on the grounds that proposed regulations,
rather than final regulations, were premature and thus insufficient to establish a likelihood of injury.1 27 The New York Attorney General and
Riverkeeper Network sued the federal government, including the
EPA, 128 to conduct an environmental impact assessment pursuant to
NEPA 1 29 and may do so again if the Delaware River Basin Commission
(DRBC) finalizes natural gas regulations. Just as unprecedented civil society protests led to a delay in the DRBC decision, New York has similarly extended its review based on a groundswell by civil society-the
New York State Health Commissioner was tasked with reviewing the
Department of Environmental Conservation's health impact analysis and
"identify the most qualified outside experts to advise him in his re-

drilling (Pittsburgh City Council based its ban on hydraulic fracturing on "health, safety and
welfare of residents and neighborhoods within the city"); John M. Smith, The Prodigal Son
Returns: Oil and Gas DrillersReturn to Pennsylvania with a Vengeance, 49 DuQ. L. REv. I,
33 (2011) (observing that Pennsylvania has better oversight of swimming pool fencing than
hydrofracking fluid fencing and noting that, "so long as Pennsylvania state law continues to
underserve its citizens by employing inadequate setbacks and oversight, municipalities may
have little choice but to restrict zoning districts in order to protect schools, residential areas or
other districts essential to public health and safety. Accordingly, the courts should find that
this effort is a valid exercise of the police powers conferred to local municipalities."); Patrick
Duprey, City Bans Hydraulic Fracturing, THE ITHACAN (Nov. 3, 2011, 12:03 PM), http://
theithacan.org/17555/ (noting the Dryden, Ithaca, and Syracuse hydraulic fracturing bans).
127 N.Y. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. Il-CV-2599, II -CV-3857, ll-CV-3780,
2012 U.S. App. WL 4336701, at *11-12 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). On Sept. 24, 2012, a New York

federal court dismissed as premature three lawsuits requesting federal agencies to conduct an
environmental impact study on the Delaware River Basin Commission's natural gas regulations since the regulations had been delayed; the three lawsuits filed in the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of New York by New York State, Damascus Citizens for Sustainability, Inc., and the Delaware Riverkeeper Network were consolidated for pretrial purposes. See id.; see also Lorraine McCarthy, Court Dismisses Lawsuits Over Draft Rules for
Delaware River Basin Gas Extraction, BNA, Sept. 28, 2012, http://news.bna.comlerln/
ERLNWB/split-display.adp?fedfid=28117548&vname=ernotallissues&jd=aOd4u7jgel &
split=0.
128 See Complaint at 1, N.Y. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. ll-CV-2599, ll-CV-

3857, 1l-CV-3780, 2012 U.S. App. WL 4336701 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2012) (No. I l-CV2599); see also N.Y. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs (The federal judge in Brooklyn dismissed
the environmental suit, without prejudice, against the Delaware River Basin Commission chal-

lenging the draft rules for lack of ripeness given the DRBC delay in issuing hydraulic fracturing regulations. This leaves the door wide open for New York State and the River Keeper
Network to return to court if and when the DRBC goes forward with regulating hydraulic
fracturing. The decision also dismissed the sovereign immunity argument and provided dicta
on the dangers of natural gas extraction.).
129 See 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (2010).
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view,"130 and then the DEC announced that it would re-initiate its rulemaking process and conduct another public hearing.131
In the meantime, the EPA has challenged the environmental impact
statement issued by the New York Department of Conservation. As federal-state responsibilities remain in limbo, subject to the manner in which
arguments play out in the judicial system, ordinary citizens have organized protests that have resulted in delaying a decision on whether to hydraulically fracture in the Delaware River Basin. The drinking water for
approximately eight million people in New York City' 3 2 faces regulatory
indecision amidst ongoing hydraulic fracturing debate among civil society, local governments, states, the federal government, courts, and a
trans-boundary water commission.
New York Attorney General Schneiderman's commitment to the
federal environmental impact assessment under NEPA prior to Delaware
River Basin natural gas permitting is at odds with the New York Department of Environmental Conservation Revised Draft Supplemental Generic Environmental Impact Statement (RDSGEIS).1 3 3 The RDSGEIS,
which in turn takes a strikingly different tone than the EPA Region 2
comments, provides over twenty-five pages of substantive recommendations for strengthening New York's environmental impact assessment.
This is an intriguing legal dynamic in which New York is providing a
check-and-balance role within the DRBC by insisting on NEPA review
and a full environmental impact statement for the DRBC while the EPA,
a named defendant in the New York suit, is in turn greatly enhancing
access to information and transparency by submitting deeply critical
130 Gerald B. Silverman, State Delays Fracking Regulations in Order to Conduct Public
Health Review, BNA, Sept. 28. 2012, http://news.bna.com/erln/ERLNWB/split-display.adp?
fedfid=28117507&vname=ernotallissues&jd=aOd4t4b2p8&split=O ("New York's environmental conservation commissioner announced Sept. 20 that the state's proposed rules for hydraulic
fracturing will be delayed for an indeterminate length of time so a public health review can be
conducted by the state Department of Health.").
131 Danny Hakim, Shift by Cuomo on Gas Drilling Prompts Both Anger and Praise,N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 1, 2012, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/01/nyregion/withnew-delays-a-growing-sense-that-gov-andrew-cuomo-will-not-approve-gas-drilling.html?ref=
todayspaper.
132 "The Delaware Aqueduct-an 85-mile water tunnel []conveys approximately half of
the drinking water from four upstate reservoirs to more than eight million people in New York
City, and one million people in Ulster, Orange, Putnam, and Westchester counties." Press
Release, NYC Dep't of Envtl. Prot. Commc'ns & Intergovernmental Affairs, DEP Begins
Study of New Method to Seal Cracks in Delaware Aqueduct (Sept. 5, 2012), availableat http:/
/www.nyc.gov/html/dep/htmlpress-releases/1 2-61 pr.shtml.
133 See N.Y. DEP'T. ENVTL. CONSERVATION,

REVISED DRAFT: SUPPLEMENTAL GENERIC

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACr STATEMENT ON THE OIL, GAS AND SOLUTION MINING REGULATORY

PROGRAM: WELL PERMIT ISSUANCE FOR HORIZONTAL DRILLING AND HIGH-VOLUME HYDRAUuIc FRACTURING To DEVELOP THE MARCELLUS SHALE AND OTHER Low-PERMEABILITY GAS

RESERVOIRS 3-4 (2011), available at http://www.dec.ny.gov/data/dmn/rdsgeisfull0911.pdf
[hereinafter NEW YORK RDSGEIS].
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comments of New York's RDSGEIS. On the one hand, this may well be
federalism at its most effective because litigation certainly brings otherwise unavailable information into the public domain. On the other hand,
it is not cooperative federalism. Yet collaborative governance is occurring quietly here and there. This author has presented at conferences in
which EPA officials and their state counterparts have shared ideas in
good faith and, together with other experts and members of the audience,
analyzed solutions. Michael Gerard's hosting of a Region 2 EPA meeting at Columbia Law School, Cornell Law students' hosting of an interdisciplinary three-day conference on natural gas, and James Van
Nostrand's inaugural West Virginia Climate and Energy Center's
hydrofracking forum, demonstrate the non-litigious approach to cooperative governance. Universities have hosted forums from Brooklyn to Buffalo and beyond.
The stakes could not be much higher, and sentiments are running in
the high-octane range. Yet, many sensible recommendations are emerging and a middle-ground is being forged. Non-state actors have been a
driving force in this process. In addition to academia, non-governmental
organizations ranging from the Natural Resources Defense Council
(NRDC) to Riverkeeper have successfully brought detailed technical information into the public domain through independent research and exercising rights to justice through citizen suits that have brought disclosures
into the public record. These efforts have enhanced the accuracy of information available to the general public. The tripartite system of checks
and balances is slowly unfolding. A more effective approach, however,
would be genuine cooperative federalism and inclusive decision-making.
Informed, inclusive decision-making on natural gas extraction is well
within the capacity of New York State, the DRBC, the federal government, and the general public.
III.

THE

DELAWARE RIVER BASIN COMMISSION: REGIONAL

ENERGY-WATER-CLIMATE DECISION-MAKING

Exxon Mobil's exploration application to the Delaware River Basin
Commission remains pending as the judiciary determines whether the
DRBC is required to conduct a NEPA environmental impact assessment
before issuing hydraulic fracturing permits.134 Fifteen million people depend upon DRBC water,135 as does the 13,539 square-mile Delaware
134 Tiffany Kary, U.S. Can Try to End New York Fracking Lawsuit, Judge Rules, BoolmBERG BUSINFSSWEEK, Aug. 10, 2011, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-08-10/u-scan-try-to-end-new-york-fracking-lawsuit-judge-rules.html.
135 DEL. RIVER BASIN COMM'N, BASIN INFO., http://www.state.nj.us/drbc/basin/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2012) ("Over 15 million people (approximately five percent of the nation's population) rely on the waters of the Delaware River Basin for drinking, agricultural, and industrial
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River Basin ecosystem.' 36 New York sued the federal government 37 to
compel NEPA environmental impact assessment and public review
before the Delaware River Basin Commission's proposed regulations for
hydraulic fracturing could go into effect.' 38 The Delaware Riverkeeper
brought a similar case.13 9
New York argued that hydraulic fracturing poses "'an unacceptable
threat to the unfiltered, fresh water supply of nine million New
Yorkers . . ' "140 The Fish and Wildlife Service and National Park
Service, two of the ten federal agencies sued by New York, supported the
New York position and encouraged the federal government to conduct an
environmental impact assessment of hydraulic fracturing.1 4 1 The New
York suit against the federal government withstood the federal argument
that it has sovereign immunity and may not be sued unless it has waived
its immunity or has consented to the suit.14 2 Substantively and procedurally, making water governance decisions at the watershed level can optimize transboundary cooperative federalism. Does this approach extend
to procedural and substantive natural gas decision-making as well?
In 1961, Delaware, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and a
representative from the federal government entered into the Delaware
River Basin Compact 4 3 to regionally protect and manage the Delaware
River Basin. They established the Delaware River Basin Commission'44
to coordinate regional management of the basin. The DRBC is a federalinterstate compact government agency.145 This regional legal entity
came into being in 1961 when President Kennedy and the governors of
Delaware, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and New York signed concurrent
compact legislation.' 46 Delaware River Basin Commission Meetings
use, but the watershed drains only four-tenths of one percent of the total continental U.S. land
area.").
136 See Press Release, The Del. River Basin Comm'n (DRBC), DRBC Postpones November 21 Special Meeting: New Meeting Date Still to be Determined (Nov. 18, 2011), http://
www.nj.gov/drbc/home/newsroom/news/approved/20 111118_newsrel-naturalgas.html.
137 Complaint at 1, N.Y. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. I-CV-2599, I I-CV-3857,
I I-CV-3780, 2012 U.S. App. WL 4336701 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2012) (No. I-CV-2599).
138 See 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. (2010).

139 Complaint at 1, Del. Riverkeeper Network v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, (No. IICV-3780), available at http://www.delawareriverkeeper.org/resources/Comments/Fracking
Complaint.pdf.
140 Complaint at 3, N.Y. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, (No. ll-CV-2599).
141 Kary, supra note 134.

142 See Gray v. Bell, 712 F.2d 490, 507 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
143 See Delaware River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 87-328, 75 Stat. 688 (1961), available at http://www.state.nj.us/drbc/regs/compa.pdf.
144 See id.
145 DEL. RIVER BASIN COMM'N, NATURAL GAS DRILLING INDEX PAGE, http://www.nj.gov/

drbc/programs/natural (last visited Sept. 26, 2012).

146 Dim. RIVER BASIN COMM'N, Anour DRBC, http://www.nj.gov/drbc/about/ (last vis-

ited Sept. 26, 2012).
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gather four state commissioners as well as the North Atlantic Division
Engineer of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers as the federal representative.147 Before the DRBC, coordination was difficult among over seventy-five federal, interstate, and state agencies with mandates covering
disparate and overlapping aspects of watershed management along the
330 miles of the Delaware River. 14 8 Now, each DRBC commissioner
holds a vote of equal sway, and a majority vote resolves most decisions;
budget and drought declarations require unanimous votes. 149
Business meetings, hearings, and advisory committees are open to
the public.o5 0 This public participation combined with regional management provides a model for good governance. The DRBC basin-wide
comprehensive water management plan, combined with its water resources program that coordinates quality and quantity needs among basin
stakeholders' 5 1 makes the DRBC flexible enough to carry out adaptive
management in the face of evolving scientific water-energy-climate understanding.1 5 2 Importantly, the DRBC can both allocate water and conduct, sponsor, and share research to enhance its adaptive governance
capacity.15 3
Each Compact Signatory State has committed to promulgating adequate water governance legislation.1 54 Yet unconventional natural gas
extraction challenges water conservation and ecosystem integrity commitments. The Compact does not allow projects that "substantially impair or conflict with [the comprehensive] plan." 155 Furthermore, the
Compact encourages Commission water governance that safeguards
"public health, stream quality control, economic development, improvement of fisheries, recreation, dilution and abatement of pollution, [and]
147 Id.

148 See id. (explaining that the Delaware River runs from Hancock, New York to the
Delaware Bay).
149 Id. ("Commission programs include water quality protection, water supply allocation,
regulatory review (permitting), water conservation initiatives, watershed planning, drought
management, flood loss reduction, and recreation. The DRBC is funded by the signatory parties, project review fees, water use charges, and fines, as well as federal, state, and private
grants.").
150 Id.

151 See Delaware River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 87-328, 75 Stat. 688, art. III,

§ 3.2(a)-(b) (1961) available at http://www.state.nj.us/drbc/regs/compa.pdf.
152 See generally William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U.
L.J. 108 (2005) (discussing environmental federalism and overlapping regulatory capacity); see also David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The Case
Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 92 MINN. L. Rv. 1796 (2008).
153 Noah D. Hall, Interstate Water Compacts and Climate Change Adaptation, 5 ENvTL.
& ENERGY L. & Pot'Y J. 237, 289 (2010). Furthermore, "[aipproximately 5% of the United
States' population (almost fifteen million people) relies on the river for domestic and industrial
use." Id. at 288. See generally Delaware River Basin Compact, art. III, § 3.6(c).
154 See Delaware River Basin Compact, art. Ill; Hall, supra note 153, at 289-90.
155 Delaware River Basin Compact, art. III, § 3.8.
ENVTL.
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the prevention of undue salinity . . . ."156 The Delaware River Basin
encompasses special protection waters, further enhancing watershed protection. 157 According to Noah Hall, the Delaware River Basin Compact
is
in many ways a model compact for adapting to the risks
and uncertainties of climate change. It provides comprehensive planning and enforcement, rigorous water conservation, and an ecosystem protection regime. Most
importantly, the Delaware River Basin Commission has
the legal authority and resources to address new circumstances and stresses without severely disrupting water
uses and rights.' 5 8
The Commission can control surface and groundwater withdrawals 5 9
and bring legal action against any entity in violation of the Compact's
provisions pursuant to the Compact. 160 Yet, in the context of unconventional natural gas extraction, it is striking that only New York State has
challenged the actions of the Commission with regard to water
governance.
Over thirty percent of the Delaware River Basin lies over the
Marcellus Shale formation.161 This area is inhabited by five million people.162 New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg explained that,
"'[b]ecause full-scale development of natural gas exploitation in the watershed could degrade water quality, a rush to regulate and drill risks the
long-term viability of one of the most important drinking water sources
in the United States.' "163 As a tight geologic formation, Marcellus Shale
156 Id. art. IV, § 4.2(a); see also Hall, supra note 153, at 289 ("The Commission can also
sponsor any soil conservation, forestry, or fish and wildlife project that is related to the water
resources of the basin.") (citing Delaware River Basin Compact, art. VII); see generally Delaware River Basin Compact, art. VII.
157 See Kevin J. Garber et al., Water Sourcing and Wastewater Disposal: Two of the Least
Worrisome Aspects of Marcellus Shale Development in Pennsylvania, 13 DuQ. Bus. L.J. 169,
176 (2011).
158 Hall, supra note 153, at 290.
159 Delaware River Basin Compact, art. X, § 10.1.
160 Id. art. V, § 5.4.
161 Brigid R. Landy & Michael B. Reese, Getting to "Yes": A Proposalfor a Statutory
Approach to Compulsory Pooling in Pennsylvania, 41 ENvrT. L. REP. 11044, 11044, 11047
(2011) (noting that, "as rock oil began to replace whale oil as the dominant source of fuel for
illumination, supply often exceeded demand"); see generally U.S. ENERGY INFo. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2011 WIfH PROmenONS Tro 2035 EARLY RELEASE REP1lORT 1 (2010),

available at http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/aeolgas.html.
162 Landy & Reese, supra note 161, at 11047 (2011).
163 STATE OF DELAWARE, MARKELL: "FRACKING" PROPOSAL CURRENTLY LACKS Sumns

CIENT HEALTH AND SAFETY PRoTEcTrONs, http://news.delaware.gov/201 1/11/17/
drbc-fracking/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2012) (describing the needed "close coordination" of the
following regulatory regimes: the state and local governments of Pennsylvania and New York,
coupled with the Federal Environmental Protection Agency and the Commission. Some of
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natural gas deposits have not been seen as recoverable until recent use of
technological advances in hydraulic fracturing increased costs of extracting conventional energy and exemptions to federal environmental

laws.164
In 2009, the DRBC required approval for the commencement of all
natural gas extraction within the basin's Special Protection Waters given
the significant impact that unconventional natural gas production can
have on the basin's surface and groundwater quality and quantity. 165
The DRBC found that as a result of "water withdrawals, wastewater disposal, and other activities, natural gas extraction projects in shale formations may individually or cumulatively affect the water quality of Special
Protection Waters by altering their physical, biological, chemical or hydrological characteristics." 1 6 6 The DRBC further clarified that this determination included all natural gas extraction drilling pads, related
activities/facilities, and all water withdrawals used.' 67
In 2010, the DRBC issued draft regulations for hydraulic fracturing
and scheduled a final vote for November 2011. A large civil society
demonstration was planned for the November 21 meeting to express the
broad view that the draft rules do not adequately protect drinking water
supplies.' 6 8 New York and Delaware favored a meeting postponement,
while Pennsylvania and New Jersey were likely to approve the draft regulations, so the federal government held the deciding vote as to whether
to approve the regulations.16 9 The DRBC, however, postponed its November 21, 2011 meeting, leaving the five commission-members addithese regulatory schemes have (1) yet to be finalized; (2) have just been finalized but not fully
evaluated; or (3) are final but inadequate.).
164 Landy & Reese, supra note 161, at 11046-49.
165 See Garber et al., supra note 157, at 179-80. The DRBC Executive Director issued a
determination under 18 C.F.R. § 401.35(a) that DRBC review is to remain consistent with the
Delaware River Basin Comprehensive Plan, largely found in the DRBC Water Code. See id.
Furthermore, in December 2010, the DRBC proposed a new Article 7 of its Water Quality
Regulation to protect the basin's water resources during construction and operation of natural
gas development projects. Id. at 180. The proposed Article 7 applies to water withdrawal,
well pad infrastructure, and wastewaters. Id.
166 Press Release, Del. River Basin Comm'n, DRBC Eliminates Review Thresholds for
Gas Extraction Projects in Shale Formations in Delaware Basin's Special Protection Waters
(May 2009), available at http://www.state.nj.us/drbc/programs/natural/archives.html#2.
167 See id.

168 STATOMPACT PA., DELAWARE RIvER BASIN COMMISSION: BAITILEGROUND FOR GAS
DRILLINo, http://stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/tag/drbc/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2012) ("The
DRBC is funded by the states, the federal government, permit fees, fines, as well as public and
private grants. The Delaware River is the longest free-flowing river east of the Mississippi
with its headwaters located in Hancock, N.Y. It stretches 330 miles and empties into the
Delaware Bay. The Delaware River provides drinking water to about 15 million people in
New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Delaware. In 1968 the Delaware River was declared a 'Wild and Scenic River' by President Lyndon Johnson, which affords it special pro-

tection. Parts of the river have also received the designation of 'special protection waters.'").
169 Id.
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tional time for review of the draft natural gas regulations. 7 0 Delaware
Governor Jack Markell's announcement that he would vote against the
approval of unconventional natural gas extraction was crucial to the
delayed vote.' 7 '
While expressing appreciation for fellow member states' interest in
hydraulic fracturing jobs and tax revenue, Governor Markell explained
that
[a]s a downstream state that could be adversely affected
by poorly crafted and/or executed regulations, Delaware
is focused on protecting the water quality throughout the
Delaware River Basin. While this watershed only covers
a small portion of the Marcellus Shale, it serves as the
primary water supply source for at least two-thirds of
Delaware's citizens.172
Markell expressed "significant concerns" that the proposed extraction
regulations would not protect the region's water supply.' 7 3 While the
DRBC's review of over 68,000 public comments' 74 reflects the profound
importance of the DRBC decision, the public needs to be able to review
and comment upon significant revisions to the draft regulations.' 75 The
DRBC publically released the draft regulations on November 8 and made
additional changes on November 16. Therefore holding the final judgment meeting on November 21st would be an inadequate window for
public participation. 7 6
There are two separate discussions underway. The first discussion
involves a decision regarding natural gas extraction, and the second discussion involves mitigating measures of such extraction. Because there
is little information in the public domain, it is unclear if the second discussion warrants any attention. At best, attention to the second discussion would provide threshold best practices for "'water withdrawal,
siting and setback requirements, drilling and construction standards,
ongoing operational protections, and clean up protocols and financial assurances should a release occur.'

"177

170 See Press Release, Del. River Basin Comm'n, DRBC Postpones November 21 Special
Meeting: New Meeting Date Still to Be Determined (Nov. 18, 2011), available at http://www.

state.nj.us/drbc/home/newsroom/news/approved/201 Ill 18_newsrel_naturalgas.html.
171 See SrATBIMPAcr PA., supra note 168.
172 STATE oF DELAWARE, supra note 163.
173 Id.
174 See id.; see also DuL. RIVER BASIN COMM'N, COMMENTS ON DEc. 2010 DRAIr NATURAL GAS REGULATIONS, http://www.state.nj.us/drbc/programs/natural/draftregs-dec2010 comments.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2012).
175 See STATE OF DELAWARE, supra note 163.
176 See id.

177 See id.
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Unconventional natural gas drillers rapidly increased operations in
rural Pennsylvania and drilled 3,000 wells in approximately three
years.17 8 Instead of conducting a thorough environmental assessment
before commencing significant industrial activity in communities, the
Marcellus Shale Advisory Commission of scientists and nongovernmental stakeholders has taken roughly four years to draft extraction recommendations. 179 "Irresponsible hydrofracturing" continues to occur in
Pennsylvania, impacting public health and environmental integrity.1 s0
Pennsylvania's legislative debate regarding scientific understanding of
sound well construction and operation continues, as does New York's
review of cementing and well construction. As a result, the DRBC is not
in a position to find state standards adequately protective of water supplies when state requirements are still a moving target or have yet to be
promulgated.

IV.

NEW YORK ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING

New York public officials are conducting a high profile hydraulic
fracturing review of economic benefits vis-A-vis adverse impacts to public health and environmental integrity. Public health and natural resource
regulation have long been recognized as within state police power authority. Based upon this police power, New York has proposed unconventional natural gas regulations."s" Yet New York's approach has a
long way to go before representing analytical environmental impact
assessment.
This Article has sketched the regulatory chaos regarding unconventional natural gas development and has analyzed the environmental justice implications of public sector gridlock. This section considers the
communication that is occurring among federal, state, industry, health,
and environmental stakeholders. Each have distinct constituents and
therefore prefer different but overlapping regulations for unconventional
natural gas extraction. This author seeks to take this communication,
which is largely in the form of comments submitted to New York during
178 See id.
179 See id.
180 See id.
181 See N.Y. ENVT. CONSuRV. LAW

§ 23-0301 (McKinney 2012). New York Environmental Conservation Law Article 23 grants DEC jurisdiction over oil and gas. Id. §§ 23-0303,
23-0305. The Department of Transportation and Public Service Commission regulate transport and siting of gas lines, respectively, without falling under the public participation provisions of New York's counterpart to NEPA, namely the State Environmental Quality Review
Act (SEQRA). N.Y. Comr. CooEs R. & REGS. tit. 6, §§ 617.5(a), 617.5(c)(35) (2011); see
also NEW YORK RDSGEIS, supra note 133, at 3-4; N.Y. DEP'T OF ENvrL. CONSERV.,

MARCEL.US SHALE, http://www.dec.ny.gov/energy/46288.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2012)
(offering an overview of hydrofracking and New York's regulatory plan).
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its State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA) required review,182 and conduct a legal analysis with which coordinated collaborative governance can emerge.
A.

EPA Substantive Recommendations to New York

The EPA advised New York to strengthen its environmental impact
analysis of radioactive flowback water before commencing hydraulic
fracturing18 3 and remove language that minimized radioactivity concerns. Subsequently, New York should enhance regulation language that
adequately responds to elevated levels of radioactivity, generally, and
concentrated exposure to naturally occurring radioactive materials
(NORM) by water treatment plant workers, in particular.184 New York
should explain how proper handling of elevated concentrations of naturally occurring materials will occur when concentrations for technologically-enhanced naturally-occurring radioactive materials (TENORM)
result from pipe scale or water treatment waste.' 8 5 Radioactive water
should not be sent to wastewater treatment plants that do not have the
capacity to treat such water.186 Similarly, New York should regulate disposal of radioactive drill cuttings that endanger human health and the
environment at a permitted offsite facility.'18
EPA stated that "NYSDEC [New York State Department of Environmental Conservation] must ensure that updated flooding conditions
are used for evaluating floodplain distances"' 8 8 and requested that NYSDEC consider floodplain prohibitions for not only well pads but all natural gas infrastructures, including pipes, transfer stations, and containment
tanks.' 89 New York should require closed loop storage rather than surface impoundments and ensure adequate liability and regulatory funding
for well, water, and related testing.190 New York should assess adverse
impacts of oil and gas infrastructure and related activities beyond narrowly focusing on hydraulic fracturing. The EPA advised broad regulation beyond narrow categories of slickwater or high volume hydraulic
fracturing.' 9 ' The EPA advised New York to recognize the New York
State Public Service Commission as a cooperating agency given its regu182 See N.Y. Com. CooEs R. & REGs. tit. 6, § 617.9(b)(5)(v) (2011).
183 EPA COMMiEMrS, supra note 17, at 2.
184 See id. at 4.
185 See id. at 14.
186 EPA's promised wastewater treatment standards for flowback will not be in place until
2014 at the earliest. See Schedule to Develop, supra note 93.
187 See EPA COMMEfNS, supra note 17, at 2.

188 Id. at 18; see also Elizabeth Burleson, Energy Revolution and Disaster Response in
the Face of Climate Change, 22 VILL. ENvTL. L.J. 169 (2011).
189 EPA COMMENrs, supra note 17, at 2.
190 See id. at 1.
191 See id. at 2.
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latory authority over natural gas gathering lines. 19 2 With regard to water

availability, New York should require permits to include reporting of
proposed water sources. 193 The EPA advised using the New York State
Department of Health Source Water Assessment Program Plan buffer
zone of a one-mile radius around community and non-transient non-community wells.194 Furthermore, this should be considered as a buffer radius with regard to any natural gas impact, not just well pad siting. The
EPA advised New York to reference recent seismic risk zone studies and
to regulate comprehensively to prevent seismic damage.195 New York
should map naturally occurring methane1 96 and require cement bond logging or equivalent tests of shallow gas zones as well as areas affecting
drinking water supplies. 197
New York should include all six principal greenhouse gas emissions, the relative lifespan of each greenhouse gas, and their global
warming potential.19 8 Further, New York should clarify direct versus
indirect emissions and specify greenhouse gas emissions that result from

unconventional natural gas development beyond the following: vented,
combustion, and fugitive emissions; within vented emissions, special
mention of "incomplete flare combustion" needs analysis given its substantial adverse contribution to climate change.199 Other greenhouse gas
emissions that need to be further analyzed include those that occur during transport, storage, and distribution, and those associated with downstream use. 200
192 See id.
193 See id.
194 See id. at 3.
195 See id.
196 See id.
197 See id. at 16.
198 See id. at 12.
199 See id. at 12; see also Elizabeth Burleson, Emerging Human Rights and Environmental Law in the Context of Hydraulic Fracturingfor Natural Gas, - CAS. W. Rvs. L. Rv.
(forthcoming 2013). EPA has published a final rule to amend new source performance standards for petroleum refinery process heaters and flaring systems; net annual savings of $79
million are predicted given the value of the gas captured. See Standards of Performance for

Petroleum Refineries; Standards of Performance for Petroleum Refineries for Which Construction, Reconstruction, or Modification Commenced After May 14, 2007, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,422,
56,422, 56,425 (Sept. 12, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 60), available at http://
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-09-12/pdf/2012-20866.pdf; ENVrt.. PRorI. AGENCY, OnAND NATURAL GAS SECTOR: NEw SOURCE PERFORMANCE STANDARDS ANi) NATIONAL EMIsSIONS STANDARDS FOR HAZARDOus AIR PoLouTANTs REVIEWS (2012) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 63), available at http://www.epa.gov/airquatityloilandgas/pdfs/20120417finalrule.

pdf (This notice has been signed by Lisa P. Jackson, EPA Administrator, and has been submitted for publication in the Federal Register.); see also ENVT. PROT. AGENCY, OVERVIEW OF
FINAL AMENDMENTS To AIR REGULATIONS FOR THE OIL AND NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY: FACT
SHEET 1 (2012), available at http://www.epa.gov/airquality/oilandgas/pdfs/20120417fs.pdf
[hereinafter FACr SHEET].

200 See EPA COMMENTs, supra note 17, at 12.
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The EPA advised New York to prohibit the use of production brine
in road-spreading, 201 noting that road-spreading of all natural gas related
wastewater would need to meet Clean Air Act provisions. 202 New York
should designate responsible regulatory authority for wastewater disposal
as well as enhance baseline and post-development air and water monitoring. 2 0 3 The EPA called for New York to quantify all volatile organic
compounds released to the atmosphere and use state of the art vapor recovery systems. 2 0 4
The EPA noted that the federal government has broader authority
than described by the RDSGEIS:
Despite some of the restrictions legislated through the
Energy Policy Act of 2005, EPA retains responsibilities
for industry oversight under several Federal statutes, including the Clean Water Act, Clean Air Act, Safe Drinking Water Act, Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, Resource
Conservation Recovery Act, Emergency Planning Community Right-to-Know Act and the National Environmental Policy Act. For example, EPA Region 2 has
regulatory authorities concerning publicly-owned treatment works (POTWs) disposal of flowback and produced water. 205
Furthermore, President Obama signed an Executive Order on April 13,
2012, creating a coordinating unconventional domestic natural gas development inter-agency working group that is likely to respond at an interstitial governance level. 2 0 6
Finally, the EPA recommended that New York update regulations
on permit provisions and that New York require disclosure of chemical
concentrations as well as chemical names. 207
201 See id. at 23; see also Elizabeth Burleson, Emerging Law Addressing Climate Change
and Water, 5 ENvrT.. & ENERGY L. & Poi.'y J. 489, 491-94 (2010) [hereinafter Burleson,

Emerging Law] (noting the complexities of disposing of brine in the desalination context).
202 See EPA COMMENTS, supra note 17, at 5-6.

203 See id. at 9 (noting that, "on August 23, 2011, the EPA published in the Federal
Register the proposed rule, 'Oil and Natural Gas Sector: New Source Performance Standards
and National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants Review.' This rule is scheduled to be promulgated in March 2012 and may broaden the scope of operations and emission
points covered by existing rules.").
204 See id. at 10.

205 Id. at 21 (noting further that "an underground injection control permit under the Safe
Drinking Water Act is required if diesel is used in the high-volume hydraulic fracturing
fluid.").
206 Exec. Order No. 13,605, 77 Fed. Reg. 23,107 (Apr. 13, 2012).
207 See EPA COMMENTS, supra note 17, at 19, 23.
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Joint Legal Memorandum by Environmental Non-Profits

The widespread nature of unconventional natural gas extraction proposed across New York warrants the SEQRA required consideration of
reasonable and feasible alternatives to the proposed action. 208 Adding
piecemeal permit conditions over outdated regulations invites compliance problems. The non-discretionary nature of regulations combined
with formal public review makes regulations a far more transparent
means of governance. 209 Straightforward oil and gas regulations should
be codified in the New York Codes, Rules and Regulations
(N.Y.C.R.R.). New York should greatly expand upon its analysis of alternatives beyond its cryptic (1) No-Action Alternative, (2) Phased Permitting Approach, and (3) Green Categories. New York has failed to
meet its statutory requirement to consider alternatives, given its paltry
coverage in a 1,500-plus-page document. 2 10 Each of these should be
meaningfully analyzed. New York should additionally consider the options of (1) waiting until the NYSDEC has regulatory capacity, 2 11 (2)
waiting until the EPA 2014 study results present feasible alternatives, (3)
giving deference to local zoning, (4) designating environmental hazard
areas off-limits to drilling, and (5) allowing unconventional natural gas

drilling only at the demonstration project scale until further environmental impact analysis can be conducted. 212
New York's RDSGEIS neither references a plan for treatment of
billions of gallons of toxic and radioactive wastewater nor provides an
adequate environmental impact analysis of shipping, storing, and treating
208 See 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.9(b)(5)(v) (1996).
209 See CATSKILL MOUNTAINKEEPER, Dui.
RIVERKEEPEIR

NETWORK, EARTHJUSTICE, THE

NAT. Ris. DEF. COUNCIL & RIVERKEEPER, COMMEIS ON THE REvisED DRAFr SUPPLEMENTAL
GENERIc ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE
UtATORY PROGRAM, WELt

OnL,

GAS AND SotUIoN MINING REG-

PERMIT ISSUANCE FOR HORIZONTAL DRILLING AND HIGH-VOLUME

HYDRAULIC FRACTURING To DEVELOP THE MARCELLUS SHALE AND OTHER Low-PERMEABIL-

ITY RESERVOIRs 3 (2012), available at http://newyork.sierraclub.org/documents/NRDCetal.
CommentsonRDSGEISandProposedRegulationsllO I 100O.pdf [hereinafter JOINT
COMMENTs].
210 CATSKILL MOUNTAINKEEPER, Dui.

RIviERKEr.EPER

RES. DEE. CoUNCIl, RIVERKEEPER & THE SIERRA

CLUB,

NETWORK,

EARTHJUSTICE, THE NAT.

JOIN'r LEGAL MEMORANDUM ON THE

REvisED DRAFr SUPPLEMENTAL GiNFRic ENVIRONMENTAL

IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE

Oi,

GAS AND Sot uTION MINING REGULATORY PROGRAM AND) PROPOSED REGULATIONS FOR HoRI
ZONTAL DRILLING AND HIGH VoL UME HYDRAUiLIC FRACTURING IN THE MARCELLUS SHALE
AND) OTHER Low-PERMEABILY-Y RESERVOIRS

1 (2012), available at http://newyork.sierraclub.

org/documents/JointLegalComments.FINALOOO.pdf [hereinafter JoINT LEGAL MEMORANDUM] (citing Webster Assocs. v. Town of Webster, 59 N.Y.2d 220, 228 (1983)) ("[T]he omission of a required item from a draft EIS cannot be cured simply by including the item in the
final EIS.").

211 Id. at 25 (stating that NYSDEC is unlikely to have the staffing capacity to respond to
unconventional natural gas extraction until, at the earliest, 2014, if at all).
212 Id. at 21.
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waste. 2 13 Similarly lacking is an analysis of pipeline construction for
expanding gas drilling, 2 14 or a quantification of negative socioeconomic
and community impacts. 2 15 The RDSGEIS highlights potential economic benefits of extracting natural gas without an analysis of likely
costs ranging from emergency response to monitoring, and does not
speak to the adverse impacts of a sudden influx of transient population
followed by a steep fall in economic prospects for long-term residents. 2 16
Taking the oil spill fund approach, the following measures should
be enacted before any drilling takes place: strict liability on operators of
drilling sites that cause contamination, NYSDEC capacity to order immediate owner/operator cleanup or take over clean up, funding a Natural
Gas Damage Recovery Fund through surcharges on natural gas permits,
2 17
and requiring owner/operator surety bonds to cover remediation costs.
New York should require "bonding and insurance that addresses the
costs and risks of long-term monitoring; publicly incurred response and
cleanup operations; site remediation and well abandonment; and adequate compensation to the public for adverse impacts . . 218 Given the
one in four chance of flooding in a thirty-year project life for wells in
one-hundred-year floodplains, setbacks should be substantially increased. 2 19 New York does not explain why a public water supply
should have a 2,000-foot setback when private water wells only receive
500-foot setbacks. 220 It would be sensible for local zoning authorities to
have authority to determine threshold setbacks beyond the state minimum to meet the needs of community characteristics and site-specific
issues. 22 1
New York should require state inspections of all well cementing and
keep permanent records. "DEC has at least partial records on 40,000
wells, but estimates that over 75,000 oil and gas wells have been drilled
in the State since the 1820s. Most of the wells date from before New
York established a regulatory program. Many of these old wells were
never properly plugged .... ."222 Such wells provide a vertical pollutant
213 See id. at 6.
214 Id.

215 Id. at 8 ("[S]ocioeconomic and environmental justice analysis requires examination of
reasonably foreseeable impacts on noise; historic resources; aesthetic resources; traffic; shortand long-term population concentration, distribution, or growth; and community character, all
of which are specifically protected by SEQRA.").
216 Id. at 6.
217 Id. at 9.
218 See Joimw COMMENTs, supra note 209, at 172.
219 See id. at 137.
220 Id. at 132.
221 Id. at 136.

222 Id. at 50. "Permanent Abandonment. A well that is no longer needed to produce
hydrocarbons should be plugged (e.g. cement barriers installed, failed casing removed,
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pathway. 223 NRDC et. al. argue that, "[bluffer zone size should increase
with geologic and technical uncertainty. Buffer zone size may decrease
as industry gains experience and data quality/quantity improves." 224
Buffer zones around water supplies should be permanent and apply to all
drinking water supplies. 2 25 NRDC et. al. explains that:
In order to ensure that the uniquely unfiltered New York
City and Syracuse watersheds remain unscathed, NYSDEC should increase its proposed 4,000-foot buffer to
preclude any horizontal drilling under these watersheds
sufficient to account for the length of current or future
horizontal well bores. Moreover, it appears that vertical
drilling and low-volume hydraulic fracturing would still
be permitted in these areas, even though they present the
same kinds of risks. NYSDEC should address these issues and clearly prohibit any activities related to natural
gas development in and under these watersheds and
buffer areas. 22 6
Furthermore, the seismic activities associated with unconventional natural gas development and wastewater disposal threaten the stability of aging and vulnerable water infrastructure. 227 Public participation has been
core to keeping open the legal option to establish "permanent, protective
buffer areas in and around all watersheds" upon which drinking supplies
depend. 228
Mandatory prior disclosure of chemical threats presented by all aspects of unconventional natural gas development should predate drilling
given the importance of baseline information with which to prove harm
in legal proceedings. The RDSGEIS proposed prior disclosure of chemical additive products by product name and purpose/type, and the proposed percent ratio follows the sensible mandatory prior disclosure best
practice modeled by Wyoming 229 but should be expanded to all chemical
threats posed by unconventional natural gas development. 230
mechanical plugs set), surface equipment removed (e.g. wellhead and piping), and permanently abandoned." Id. at 49.
223 Id. at 51. New York "requires only 15' cement plugs, as compared to Texas, Alaska,
and Pennsylvania regulations that require a series of 50'-200' cement plugs at various locations within the wellbore." Id. at 53.
224 Id. at 67.
225 JOINT LEGAL MEMORANDUM, supra note 210, at 12.

226 Id. at 11 (emphasis omitted).
227 Id. ("Allowing unsafe drilling activities to occur near aging and vulnerable water sup-

ply infrastructure poses an unreasonable risk to public health and emergency preparedness.").
228 See id. at 12.

229 See 3 Wyo. CODE R. § 45 (LexisNexis 2010).
230 See JOINT LFGAL MEMORANDUM, supra note 210, at 17 ("Because drilling mud uses
similar chemicals as hydraulic fracturing fluid, it poses many of the same hazards to the envi-
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New York should disclose individual chemicals, identified by
Chemicals Abstracts Service numbers in addition to available material
data safety sheets (MSDS), and a statement of the amount of each chemical used. This legal advice builds upon emerging best practice models in
Texas, Colorado, and Wyoming. 23 1 New York's final environmental impact analysis should reference these experienced energy-producing
states' decisions to use their police powers to regulate dangerous chemicals to protect public health and environmental integrity. Colorado responded to industry concern that competitors might reverse engineer
hydraulic fracturing additives by clarifying that Colorado disclosure of
all additives and all chemicals does not require specific lists of chemical
ingredients. 232
Mandating the use of the safest chemical additives and unconventional natural gas development methods is as equally important as the
reporting of chemicals. This broader analysis belongs in any New York
environmental impact assessment. SEQRA is designed to provide an opportunity for state decision-making to be informed, incorporating a genuine understanding of public health and environmental externalities
resulting from permitting decisions. While re-establishing federal safeguards requires cooperation in Congress, New York is in a position to
implement federal Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know
Act (EPCRA) standards 2 33 rather than the general trade secret provisions
of 6 N.Y.C.R.R. section 616.7. Doing so would fold New York's unconventional natural gas extraction into a trade secret approach designed to
weigh intellectual property rights against public health. In particular, retaining the public right to information would balance the influence of
industry on public decision-making with informed analysis on public

ronment and human health as hydraulic fracturing fluid, and should be subject to the same
disclosure requirements.").
231 See id. at 15 (citing 16 TEX. ADMIN. CoDE § 3.29(c)(1)). The Colorado Oil and Gas
Conservation Commission released a final draft for updated rules on December 13, 2011,
which requires disclosure of individual chemical constituents in addition to disclosure of additives. See CoLo. CODE REGs. § 404-l-205A(B)(2)(A)(lX)-(XII) (2011). Wyoming's rules
also require disclosure of additives as well as the Chemical Abstracts Number for individual
chemicals. See 3 Wyo. CODE R. § 45(d) (LexisNexis 2010); see also 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§ 3.29(c)(2)(ix).
232 See JoINT LEGAL MEMORANDUM, supra note 210, at 16 (referring to COLO. CODE

REGS. § 404-1-205A(B)(2)(A)(IX)-(XII) (201 t)); COLORADO DEP'T OF NAT. RES., OIL & GAS
CONSERVATION COMM'N,

AMENDMENTS TO 100 SERIES DEFINITIONS, 200 SERIES GENERAL

RULES, 300 SERIES DRILLING, DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION,

AND ABANDONMENT RULES AND

500 SERIES PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE RULES, STATEMENT OF BASIS, SPECIFIC STATUTORY
AUTHORITY, AND PURPOSE 3-4 (2012).
233 The relevant EPCRA regulations can be found at Protection of Environment, 40

C.F.R. pt. 350 (2012).
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health. EPCRA mandates public release of adverse health effects associated with each secret chemical. 234
Flaring/venting methane while drilling and completion cause substantial greenhouse gas emissions. 23 5 Reduced Emission Completions
(RECs) that capture greenhouse gas emissions 236 should be required for
wells drilled prior to construction of gathering lines. 2 3 7 Because "captured gas can be used for fuel, offsetting operating costs, or re-injected to
improve well performance," RECs are both an environmental best practice and profitable. 238 New York ambient air quality monitoring "needs
further definition, a funding commitment, and a formal industry compliance obligation." 239 New York should require measureable, enforceable

greenhouse gas mitigation plans for all natural gas operations, requiring
Natural Gas STAR Program best management technologies and
practices. 240
C.

Local Governments

Layered on top of corporate instincts to preserve competitive advantage and maximize profits are public sector instincts to preserve sovereignty. 24 1 In the absence of comprehensive federal and state regulation,

local governments are hard pressed to respond to unconventional natural
gas extraction, particularly under the natural-gas-developer-favored legal
interpretation that New York's Oil, Gas and Solution Mining Law
(OGSML) 242 preempts local zoning and land use control of the location
of natural gas wells-a position still seeking clarity via a slow path
through the judicial system.
Given the cursory analysis of the no-action option, the RDSGEIS
should be substantially revised. Doing so would provide room for a discussion of cooperative and inclusive decision-making rather than jump234 Id. § 350.21.
235
236
237
238

See JOINT COMMENTS, supra note 209, at 113-14.
See id. at 116.
See id.
Id. at 117.

239 Id. at 110; see also id. at 108 ("The modeling analysis assumed that there will be no
emissions of criteria pollutants from venting. However, the RDSGEIS proposes to allow gas
venting of up to 5 MMscf during any consecutive 12-month period, including sour gas, as long
as it is vented at least 30 feet in the air. This allowance undermines the assumption that no
criteria pollutants would be emitted during venting. The modeling analysis assumes only three
days of gas flaring per well. However, the RDSGEIS states that flaring can occur for up to a
month in some cases. Therefore, the modeling understates the potential emissions from
flaring.").
240 Id. at 113.

241 See Joseph A. Dammel, Notes from Underground: Hydraulic Fracturing in the
Marcellus Shale, 12 MINN. J. L. Sci. & TECH. 773, 806-07 (2011) (different layers of government do not always seek opportunities to work together).
242 See N.Y. ENvnT. CONSERV. LAW § 23-0303(2) (McKinney 2012).
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ing straight to Environmental Conservation Law (ECL) section 230303(2) language stating that OGSML supersedes local governance beyond local roads and real property tax collection. 243 Villages are hard
pressed to distinguish between road use by heavy agricultural vehicles
and heavy industrial trucks on sheer design of vehicle and weight on
rural dirt roads. Energy siting and environmentally sound energy-water
development can best be sustained through coordination among layers of
government, recognition of the need to prioritize health and ecosystem
services, and stakeholder participation that does not favor well-resourced
industrial representatives.
Access to information and public participation should not be limited
solely to issuance of drilling permits in state parks within 2,000 feet of
public water supply wells, and disturbance of more than two-and-onehalf acres in agricultural districts, pursuant to New York's SEQRA participation provisions. 244 Whether focusing on the NEPA inclusive review procedures or state corollaries, such as SEQRA, the objective
should be to broadly share information to better understand adverse impacts and avert harmful activity before widespread damage occurs.
New York's RDSGEIS recommends additional public input on the
following: issuance of a permit to drill when high-volume hydraulic fracturing is proposed shallower than 2,000 feet along the proposed
wellbore; where the top of the target fracture zone of the wellbore is less
than 1,000 feet below a known fresh water supply; and where a well pad
is within 500 feet of a principal aquifer. 245 Yet the report qualifies that
re-evaluation of this latter provision occurs in two years. 246 Other activities deemed worthy of public input by New York include: water withdrawals and drilling well pad distances "within 150 feet of a perennial or
intermittent stream, storm drain, lake or pond;" "ground water withdrawal within 500 feet of a private well;" or "ground water withdrawal
within 500 feet of a wetland that pump test data shows would have an
influence on the wetland." 247 Yet fragmented well-pad-by-well-pad public review is unlikely to result in adequate enforcement of health and
environmental protections when compared with comprehensive prohibitions on negatively impacting water supplies.
Similarly, local government notification based upon the following
statement is unlikely to lead to cooperative governance needed to prevent
natural gas extraction from resulting in substantial adverse impacts. A
passing mention in New York's RDSGEIS urging Road-Use Agreements
243 See NEW YORK RDSGEIS, supra note 133, at 3-4.
244 Id. at 3-15 to 3-16.
245 Id. at 3-15.
246 Id. at 3-16.

247 Id. at 3-15 to 3-16.
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between drillers and municipalities does not go far enough to address the
need to involve local governments in siting, safety, disposal, and other
important decisions going forward. First and foremost, elected local officials are well-positioned to be part of the decision-making process regarding no-action approaches to natural gas extraction as well as the
scope of operations if permits are to be issued. Stating in a draft environmental impact statement that state exclusive authority to issue well permits supersedes local government authority over well siting, and that
permits will be issued irrespective of conflicting local land use laws/regulations/ plans/policies, 24 8 does not indicate a willingness to coordinate
effective regulation of unconventional natural gas regulation. Requiring
applicants to list conflicting local law and stating that substantial adverse
impacts will be considered does not go far enough to committing to cooperative, inclusive decision-making.
The New York RDSGEIS reads as a warning to other layers of government to back off from DEC jurisdictional turf to issue permits. Beyond stating that permits will be issued in keeping with departmental
capacity, insufficient discussion of how county health departments are to
effectively respond to drinking water contamination remains to be developed by the state of New York. Regulations ranging from updated well
casing requirements to emergency response plans should apply to all natural gas development in New York. Furthermore, indirect and cumulative impacts should be part of New York's environmental impact
assessment.
V.

RECOMMENDATIONS: ADAPTIVE FEDERALISM AND THE
REGULATORY COMMONS

A.

Collaborative Governance

A useful framework for inclusive decision-making involves the following: gathering stakeholders and information and then brainstorming
and analyzing options before implementing any given approach. Polarized communities may benefit from skilled facilitator expertise
grounded in mediation approaches that can enhance collaborative governance. Enhancing public participation at the outset (in pre-application
and pre-environmental assessment contexts) can help optimize genuine
sustainable development.
This can include broad stakeholder discussion to identify appropriate locations for unconventional natural gas extraction given reliance on
shared water resources, bioaccumulation of contaminants, ecosystem fragility, density of human settlements, and other important factors that
need to be addressed before industrial production should be authorized.
248 Id. at 3-14.
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Gathering expertise from such a broad forum can begin the process of
identifying best practices to minimize negative impacts, not only at the
local level but also comprehensively evaluating externalities and conscientiously internalizing them. Model ordinances, leases, 249 and publicprivate bodies that can facilitate lifecycle analysis, and inclusive decision-making can sustain healthy communities both economically and
with regard to public health and environmental integrity. This process
can provide a base upon which to make the range of decisions from
whether/where to site to adequate bonding arrangements for eventual
decommission or possible problems with operation.
If natural gas is to receive special support as a "transition fuel," then
firm renewable targets for renewable energy production and efficiency
should be legally mandated as an integral part of any effort to publically
support unconventional natural gas extraction. 250
Participatory planning can go beyond deliberative polling and can
occur well before the process has reached a mitigation discussion. 25 1
Doing so may change the dynamic described by Sean Nolon in which
success tends to depend upon siting negotiation in which "(1) each party
must possess something to trade; (2) 'deals' must be possible that are
better than 'no deal'; (3) each party must trust that the other will honor
its promises; and (4) each party must believe the above is true." 2 52
Societal agreement to transition away from oil and coal may not
equate to local siting coordination on given energy projects. What appears to be a clear police power to some looks more like a governmental
taking of private property to others. Jurisdictions do not have free reign
to require setbacks and other mitigating measures in light of existing
jurisprudence.
249 See Drillers Fail to Share Fracking Risks With Landowners - EWG, GREENWIRE, Dec.
12, 2011, http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/rss/2011/12/12/1l ("Natural gas companies that
employ hydraulic fracturing are disclosing drilling risks to shareholders but not to landowners

250 See generally Elizabeth Burleson, Wind Power, National Security, and Sound Energy
Policy, 17 PENN ST. ENvrm. L. Ruv. 137 (2009).
251 See Negotiated Rulemaking Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 563-68 (2006) (Inclusive decision-making can begin well before this rulemaking stage in which a representative group of stakeholders tend to focus on consensus building with regard to mitigating measures rather than whether
to conduct the activity at all.). See also Envtl. Working Group v. N.Y. Dep't Envtl. Conservation, No. 5159-12 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed Sept. 17, 2012) (lawsuit filed by Environmental Working Group against NYSDEC and the Governor to obtain documents related to the drafting of
state rules to limit hydraulic fracturing to extract natural gas); Chris Dolmetsch, New York
Sued by Environmental Group Seeking Fracking Documents, BLOOMBEiRG, Sept. 19, 2012,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-19/new-york-sued-by-environmental-group-seeking-fracking-documents.html.
252 Sean Nolon, supra note 57, at 369 (citing MICHAEL O'HARE ET AL., FACILITY SITING
AND PuBuIc OPPosrriON 90 (1983)).
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To this author, best practices involve meaningfully involving experts and civil society when value judgments are at issue so that consensus can be reached regarding optimal energy siting that does not
unacceptably compromise environmental and public health. Such collaborative decision-making requires the public sector to adequately support
inclusive processes with technical and advisory support as well as provide oversight regarding unacceptable health and environmental thresholds that should not be exchanged for short-term monetary gains. This
might look like a public-private body comparable to a transboundary
water commission, but one that is resilient in the face of regulatory
capture.
B.

Environmental and Health Impact Assessments

The federal government should conduct a national environmental
impact analysis of unconventional natural gas extraction to ensure that
any development is done as safely as possible. This can best be accomplished through broad access to information, public participation, and access to justice. This process can lead to innovations that optimize safe
and environmentally sound technologies and procedures. 253
Health Impact Assessments (HIAs) should also be conducted before
any unconventional natural gas development commences; HIAs have
been carried out for Bureau of Land Management oil and gas extraction
plans for Alaska's North Slope 254 as well as for natural gas development
in Garfield County, Colorado. 255
C.

No Action Option

France has said no to hydrofracking. 256 Before any discussion of
buffer zones, flowback provisions, and other ways to mitigate unconventional natural gas extraction, there should be a full and inclusive process
of decision-making concerning whether unconventional natural gas extraction should be authorized.
253 See generally Elizabeth Burleson, Energy Policy, Intellectual Property, and Technology Transfer to Address Climate Change, 18 TRANSNAT'L. L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69 (2009).
254 See Rajiv Bhatia & Aaron Wernham, Integrating Human Health into Environmental

Impact Assessment: An Unrealized Opportunity for Environmental Health and Justice, 116
ENVIL. HEALTH PERSP. 991, 991-1000 (2008), availableat http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/

articles/PMC2516559/.
COLo. SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH, HEALTH IMPACT ASSESSCOUNTY COLORADO (2010).
256 See Tara Patel, France Vote Outlaws 'Fracking' Shale for Natural Gas, Oil Extraction, BLOOMBERG, July 1, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-01/france-voteoutlaws-fracking-shale-for-natural-gas-oil-extraction.html.
255

See ROXANNA WIrrER ET AL.,

MENT FOR BATTLEMENT MESA, GARFIELD
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The no-action alternative, a prohibition on development of the
Marcellus and Utica Shale 257 plays in New York, was not considered
beyond stating that, while none of the adverse impacts would occur, none
of the economic benefits would occur either. For an environmental impact statement, this is notably cryptic. The organizational decision-making in designing the RDSGEIS is also striking. The economic benefits
are described at length up front, while the no-action alternative is given
little more than four paragraphs on pages 9-1 to 9-3 and is quickly followed by a phased permitting approach. 258 Beginning an environmental
impact analysis with a lengthy narrative on potential drilling jobs followed by paltry text on sustaining a moratorium does not appear to meet
the statutory requirements of environmental impact analysis. It is inadequate to make a reference to the public interest language in Article 230301 of the ECL 2 59 without balancing the public's need for energy with
(1) the public interest in investing in renewable energy, (2) the public
interest in substantially lowering such greenhouse gases as methane (natural gas), and (3) the public interest to protect the drinking water of approximately eight million people in New York City. As a revised draft
environmental impact statement, the lack of discussion of the full impact
on the environment by natural gas extraction is striking.
While it is in the public interest for home heating prices to be affordable, it is not in the public interest to ramp up natural gas production
to ensure very cheap methane production and consumption without regard to public health and environmental integrity. The discussion of environmental safeguards that are genuinely protective of water supplies
and habitats is a nascent one that has yet to bring informed stakeholders
to the table to broaden the public/private understanding of the scope and
depth of adverse impacts from natural gas extraction. It is not clear that
natural gas is an adequate "bridging fuel" to renewable energy; MIT has
found that natural gas production appears to be stunting renewable en257 See JOINT COMMENrs, supra note 209, at 3 (While the RDSGEIS mentions baseline

geologic aspects of the Utica shale, the lack of environmental impact assessment on depths
other than the Marcellus shale makes it important for this analysis to occur; require Utica
Shale or other unnamed low-permeability gas reservoir development have site-specific supplemental environmental impact statement review; or issue future SGEIS beyond the Marcellus
shale.).
258 See NEw YORK RDSGEIS, supra note 133, at 9-1 to 9-3.

259 See N.Y. ENvT. CONSERV. LAW § 23-0301 (McKinney 2007) ("It is hereby declared
to be in the public interest to regulate the development, production and utilization of natural
resources of oil and gas in this state in such a manner as will prevent waste; to authorize and to
provide for the operation and development of oil and gas properties in such a manner that a
greater ultimate recovery of oil and gas may be had, and that the correlative rights of all
owners and the rights of all persons including landowners and the general public may be fully
protected, and to provide in similar fashion for the underground storage of gas, the solution
mining of salt and geothermal, stratigraphic and brine disposal wells.").
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ergy. 260 Environmentally sound energy use is in the public interest, as is
enhancing efficiency, conservation, and the array of energy sources that
optimize environmentally sound, sustainable development.
It is insufficient to say, in an environmental impact statement, that
increasing the supply of unconventional natural gas will lower prices of
natural gas and then move quickly to job production. Renewable energy
also creates jobs. 2 6 1 Pitting job creation against environmentally sound
energy use is not an analytical exercise and should not be the only discussion occurring in an environmental impact statement. The no-action
section of the RDSGEIS is not the appropriate location to continue an
already extensive discussion regarding drilling jobs, private mineral royalties, and subsequent state taxes. This author finds the following statement insufficient for a no-action analysis in an environmental impact
statement (draft or otherwise):
The no-action alternative is also not favored because
most of the potential significant adverse impacts identified in this Supplement can be fully mitigated by the
measures outlined in Chapter 7. Other significant adverse impacts can be partially mitigated, or are temporary in nature. A prohibition would also deny owners of
mineral interests an opportunity to realize the benefit of
mineral rights ownership. Accordingly, it is not a recommended alternative to the rational and controlled development proposed in this Supplement. 262
New York's phased permitting approach raises but does not adequately
address the need to protect New York's drinking watersheds. Simply
waiting several years before permitting drilling over aquifers 26 3 is not a
viable approach to promote public safety, a paramount public interest
and one that permits states to utilize police powers to protect the public.
This author's definition of energy security does not include jeopardizing public water supplies. Temporarily delaying permitting in NYC
and Syracuse watersheds does not adequately address sustaining public
water supply protective measures. The following recommendation by
the RDSGEIS should be strengthened to promote public safety:
[W]ell pads for high-volume hydraulic fracturing [would
not be permitted] within 2,000 feet of public water supply wells, river or stream intakes or reservoirs until at
260 See Jacoby et al., supra note
261 See, e.g.,

RENWAiuF

1, at

37-39.

ENERGY JOBs,

BROWSE RENEWABLE

ENERGY

Jons, http://

www.renewableenergyjobs.com (last visited Oct. 10, 2012); RENEWABLE ENERGY WORLD,
JOBS HOME, http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/careers (last visited Oct. 10, 2012).
262 See NEW YORK RDSGEIS, supra note 133, at 9-3.
263 See id. at 9-6.
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least 3 years after issuance of the first permit for highvolume hydraulic fracturing. Reconsideration of this
prohibition at that time would be based on actual experience and impacts associated with permit issuance
outside these buffer zones. This approach functions as a
partial "phased" permitting approach because it prohibits
and limits activities in areas deemed to be especially
sensitive where a phased and cautious approach is
merited. 264
A cautious approach is necessary everywhere, as is serious consideration
of a genuine buffer zone that does not allow industrial activity under or
near drinking water supplies. Genuinely independent experts and individuals whose drinking water is at stake should be brought into the decision-making process in a meaningful way that enhances both
understanding and insight for sustaining public health and environmental
integrity. Is placing a drill pad 2,000 feet from the edge of a public water
well a sufficient distance to permit drilling when horizontal drilling can
extend a mile from the drill pad under the water supply? Is delaying only
high-volume hydraulic fracturing within 500 feet from a primary aquifer
for two years an adequate scope, distance, and timeframe? Should independent non-industry scientists be determining these safety thresholds
before drilling commences rather than on a piecemeal level over the next
several years in isolated case studies? Should only two to three years
rather than the long term be considered a sufficient precautionary window with which to refrain from drilling over public water supplies?
What about private wells and the individuals who will be drinking water
from these wells over the next several years whose health may be at
stake while studies progress slowly? If site specific SEQRA determinations are as deferential to drilling jobs, lowering natural gas prices, and
tax revenues over actual environmental impacts, then do individualized
reviews of this time adequately protect water supplies? It will be difficult for each local water supply impact to outweigh the generalized projections of economic advantages that proponents of fracking advance to
promote unconventional natural gas extraction. Should fragmented sitespecific studies be relied upon with regard to protecting drinking water
when blanket prohibitions against drilling in the vicinity of drinking
water supplies could be both more economically efficient and environmentally protective? Asking such questions could result in different recommendations than those released by the NYSDEC in its RDSGEIS.
Budgetary constraints are an unpredictable proxy for health or environmental enforcement. On page 9-7, the RDSGEIS "proposes to limit
264 See id.
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the number of permits it issues to match the Department resources that
are made available to review and approve permit applications and to adequately inspect well pads and enforce permit conditions and regulations." 2 65 This statement hangs at the end of the discussion on protecting
drinking supplies, presumably as an insufficient means of soothing public concern.
Given the placement of the discussion of non-chemical fracturing
technologies and additives within the alternatives section of the RDSGEIS, it is inadequate to end the discussion with "further research .. . is
warranted ... ."266 The report acknowledges that, "recognition of potential hazards has motivated investigation into environmentally-friendly alternatives for hydraulic fracturing technologies and chemical
additives." 267 The report also recognizes that, to date, greener technologies reduce without eliminating toxicity in unconventional natural gas
extraction. 26 8 The NYSDEC should greatly expand the report's recommendation of full lifecycle analysis of chemical impacts to include the
entire range of adverse impacts resulting from unconventional natural
gas extraction, rather than solely the development of less toxic hydraulic
fracturing fluids.
While stabilizing short-term domestic energy needs is a valid argument in its own right, an analytically robust lifecycle analysis of energy
sources and efficiency measures is long overdue and should be conducted by the public sector before jeopardizing drinking water supplies
on the grounds that energy security depends upon compromising water
security.
D.

Enhancing Federal Law Covering Natural Gas Extraction

Congress should reestablish federal thresholds that can protect public health and the environment from unconventional natural gas operations. Enacting the FRAC Act to close the Halliburton Loophole 26 9
would be a sensible first step. In 2009, companion bills H.R. 2766 and
S. 1215 were introduced into Congress to amend the SDWA to once
again cover hydraulic fracturing. 270 The FRAC Act was reintroduced in
2011 but has yet to build the political steam necessary to amend the
SDWA definition of "underground injection" to include injection in the
265
266
267
268

Id. at 9-7.
Id.
Id.
Id.

269 On June 9, 2009, Sen. Bob Casey Jr. (D-Pa.) introduced Senate Bill 1215 into the
111th Congress-the Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals (FRAC) Act, S.
1215, 111th Cong. (2009).
270 See id.; Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals (FRAC) Act, H.R.
2766, 111th Cong. (2009).
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context of hydraulic fracturing. 271 The FRAC Act would also mandate
public disclosure of chemicals used in unconventional natural gas production while retaining industry proprietary control over chemical
formulas. 272
This analysis is mindful of industry's interest in minimizing external oversight and maximizing secrecy of operations. Property law in the
United States is an ongoing balancing act among protecting the general
public, preserving the public trust, and recognizing individual property
rights. Police powers are powerful and can be used to require development to adhere to sustainability criteria. 273 In the context of natural gas
extraction in residential communities, brick production looks benign. Intellectual property rights are not more sacred than other property rights
or public health.
Reestablishing comprehensive federal thresholds for drinking water
that encompass natural gas extraction would bring mandatory disclosure
back to the comparatively better-resourced federal level. A federal floor
and data collection process would provide vital information that would
allow both technology and regulations to adapt to sustainable water-energy-climate policy.
The unconventional natural gas industry is comparable to numerous
other economic sectors, both in the energy field and beyond, that are
subject to federal regulation. Hannah Wiseman has analyzed the similarities between unconventional natural gas extraction and coal mining,
both of which vary from one location to another without impeding the
EPA's capacity to regulate impoundments and related activities. 274 The
United States is witnessing an unprecedented regulatory drafting race to
the bottom in the context of unconventional natural gas extraction. Proposed state and DRBC regulations read like internal industry reports
rather than comprehensive rules capable of internalizing the range of
public health and environmental impacts that result from unconventional
natural gas development.
Given the regulatory gaps in climate-energy-water governance,
transboundary coordination should focus on enhancing existing legislation and drafting acceptable new provisions that balance public health
with energy dependence and ecosystem sustainability. Inclusive deci271 See S. 587, 112th Cong. §2(a) (2011); H.R. 1084, 112th Cong. §2(a) (2011).
272 See S. 587, 112th Cong. §2(b); H.R. 1084, 112th Cong. §2(b); Susan L. Sakmar, The
Global Shale Gas Initiative: Will the United States be the Role Model for the Development of
Shale Gas Around the World?, 33 Hous. J. IrTr'L L. 369, 410-11 (2011); see also FRACTURING
RESPONSIBILITY AND AWARENESS OF CHEMICALS

ACT OF 2011, GoVTRACK.Us,

http://www.

govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bilI=hI 12-1084 (last visited Sept. 27, 2012).
273 See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410-11 (1915) (recognizing broad police
power).
274 Wiseman, supra note 122, at 288-89.
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sion-making can result in unconventional natural gas regulations that are
as effective as federal Emergency Planning and Community Right-toKnow Act coverage.
1. Disclosures, Environmentally Sound Innovation, and Adaptive
Management
Intellectual property rights and safety standards should not be mutually exclusive. Disclosure would incentivize internalizing adverse impacts of gas extraction and help decision-makers identify best practices.
Disclosure data can inform decision-making by making available empirical data that would allow decision-makers to determine minimally environmentally damaging extraction methods. This process could be
strengthened by collaborative analysis among jurisdictions, publicly
funded university researchers, and the private sector.
Regulation can force technological innovation by ruling out chemicals with unacceptable impacts on the environment and human health.
Pooling all current information regarding the adverse impacts of unconventional natural gas extraction not only facilitates lifecycle analysis
across energy options, but may also enable natural gas production to proceed using effective methods that minimize adverse impacts to environmental and human health. This remains an open question in need of
further study based on open information sharing and meaningful involvement by relevant actors.
Adaptive management of unconventional natural gas extraction can
involve banning unacceptably harmful chemicals and methods as soon as
best practices are identified and proven effective. While geology and
water availability vary across drilling locations, public-private research
capacity is robust enough to identify best practices for a wide array of
factors given current coding, mapping, and analytical expertise. Interdisciplinary and transboundary cooperation can replace random industry experimentation that currently occurs at the expense of public health and
environmental integrity.
Incentivizing innovation through intellectual property right protection is a well-established public good, but it must be weighed against
other public goods, such as public health. Trade secrets and the corporate revenue stream protected by such secrets do not outweigh the legal
requirements to sustain safe drinking water.2 75
Police power to protect public health need not impede innovation in
energy diversification. Intellectual property law protects companies
through trade secrets, patents, copyrights, and trademarks. This field of
law has long balanced the property rights of innovators with the public
275 See Burleson & Burleson, supra note 30, at 670.
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interest in broadly available goods. 2 76 For this reason, some property
rights expire after a reasonable timeframe when the given innovation becomes part of the public domain. 277 As long as a trade secret remains a
secret, owners can sustain revenue streams well beyond the common patent timeframes. Trade secret law has protected the Coca Cola formula
for over a century, yet trade secret law is not immune from the balancing
of public health and property rights. Ultimately, the public sector has the
police power to place the public safety before monetary gain by a given
industry.
Groundwater protections and recycling requirements can provide incentives for technological innovation to adequately address the water
pollution associated with natural gas production. Maximizing the recycling of flowback water is an area in need of greater innovation if
natural gas development is to proceed. To date, the cost of wastewater
recycling far exceeds that of injecting contaminated water into underground formations. 27 8 Seismic instability, however, appears to present
serious challenges to the practice of blasting large volumes of wastewater
underground. 279 Filling the regulatory gaps governing unconventional
natural gas can be done in a manner that sustains energy innovation as
well as robust public health and environmental measures.
2.

Energy Security, Climate Stability, and Good Governance

This author recommends that the leakage rates of unconventional
natural gas extraction be ascertained and compared with the greenhouse
gas footprint of other energy options before public/private resources are
committed to further development. Debating the relative emissions of
natural gas flaring and leakage, 280 as opposed to mountain top removal
276 AIDS drug availability in Africa presents another context in which public health and
proprietary property rights have been weighed, leading to broader AIDS drug availability. See
generally Horace Anderson, We Can Work It Out: Co-Op Compulsory Licensing as the Way
Forward in Improving Access to Anti-Retroviral Drugs, 16 B.U. J. Sc. & TECH. L. 167
(2010); Brook K. Baker, ACTA: Risks of Third-PartyEnforcementfor Access to Medicines, 26
AM. U. IN'L. L. Rrv. 579 (2011); Linda Fentiman, AIDS as a Chronic Illness: A Cautionary
Tale for the End of the Twentieth Century, 61 ALE. L. REv. 989 (1998).
277 See generally Ann Bartow, Open Access, Law, Knowledge, Copyrights, Dominance
and Subordination, 10 LEwis & CLARK L. REv. 869 (2006).
278 See ENVTL. PRor. AGENCY, NATURAL GAS DRILLING IN THE MARCELLUS SHALE:
NPDES PROGRAM FREQUEnTLY ASKED QUESTIONs 3 (2011), available at http://www.epa.gov/

npdespub/pubs/hydrofracturingjfaq.pdf; R. Marcus Cady II, Drilling Into the Issues: A Critical Analysis of Urban Drilling's Legal, Environmental, and Regulatory Implications, 16 Ti.x.
WESLEYAN L. REV. 127, 146 (2009); see generally Symposium, 'Shale' We Drill? The Legal
and Environmental Impacts of Extracting Natural Gas From Marcellus Shale, 22 VILL.
ENVTL. L.J. 189 (2011) [hereinafter Symposium, 'Shale' We Drill?] (discussing recycling,
treatment, and injection of wastewater under ground).
279 See 4.0 Earthquake, supra note 18.
280 See Symposium, 'Shale' We Drill?, supra note 278, at 198 ("Air pollution occurs at
nearly every stage of the construction and drilling phase of an oil and gas well.").
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coal production, strikes this author as a race to the bottom. Broadly sharing accurate life-cycle analysis across all energy options can facilitate
energy sustainable development.
First and foremost, strict regulations need to be enforced to prohibit
flaring natural gas. Industry flaring, venting, and release of natural gas
have substantial climate destabilizing consequences. 2 81 Less clear are
the rates of flaring and the projected leakage rates for natural gas production and transport, yet, these numbers matter when trying to assess the
relative impacts of natural gas vis-A-vis coal, oil, or nuclear cradle to
grave impacts. Cornell professors are struggling to come to terms with
whether natural gas should become a bridging fuel. 2 8 2
This author recommends enhancing disclosure requirements for the
full range of data necessary to generate life-cycle analysis, including industry-wide greenhouse gas emission rates. This can be done at the stage
of participating in the stock market, obtaining insurance, qualifying for
public subsidies, before receiving tax-advantaged status, when amending
existing environmental statutes such as the Clean Air Act, or by EPA
rule-making, just to mention a few approaches. Given the international
nature of the climate collective action problem, such legal requirements
could be written into the climate instrument that countries have recently
committed to ratify by 2020.283 A Rip Van Winkle siesta until then is
not advisable; there is a need for local momentum to continue to propel
environmentally sound decisions into the constrained market place. Local impacts in the form of cancer spikes in given communities allow
ordinary citizens to highlight the inequity of allowing large corporations
to continue to externalize pollution costs. Neighboring communities care
about both steady employment and averting terminal illnesses as a result
of exposure to contaminants. All this ground is well-trodden by this author and many others across a myriad of fields of inquiry, and yet all this
inquiring has yet to alter the corporate incentives or enhance the capacity
of disenfranchised communities to achieve environmental justice. Many
281 Anna Driver & Bruce Nichols, Shale Oil Boom Sends Waste Gas Burn-Off Soaring,
RiEUTE;Rs, July 25, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/25/us-shale-flaring-idUSTR
E7604SU20110725 (noting that flaring of natural gas substantially adds to global warming).
282 See Robert W. Howarth & Anthony Ingraffea, Should Fracking Stop?, 477 NATlURE
271, 271-75 (2011).
283 The Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has decided
that the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action shall
complete its work as early as possible but no later than 2015 in order to adopt this
protocol, legal instrument or agreed outcome with legal force at the twenty-first session of the Conference of the Parties and for it to come into effect and be implemented from 2020.
See Conference of the Parties, Nov. 28-Dec. 9, 2011, Establishment of an Ad Hoc Working
Group on the Durban Platfform for Enhanced Action, I 3, Draft decision -/CP. 17 (Dec. 10,
2011), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/201 l/copl7/eng/ll0.pdf.
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ordinary individuals shy away from the term altogether, not wanting to
be seen as anything other than well-meaning, middle-of-the-road, familyoriented Americans. Pitting jobs against health is a no-win proposition.
Both are important and not mutually exclusive. Thus, governance plays
an important role in ensuring that decision-making is not only not unconstitutionally arbitrary and capricious, but is in fact well-reasoned and
based on a sound understanding of the ramifications-economic, societal, and environmental.
Sound decision-making can happen at all levels of governance and
is facilitated by checks and balances, both on the part of the public sector
and members of the general public. Few members of the general public
have the time, inclination, or resources with which to voice their perspectives, unlike their corporate counterparts whose core business mandate
often rests upon lowering regulatory requirements and environmental
protections. People take to the streets when they feel threatened. During
the civil rights era, peoples' taking to the streets raised enough visibility
to create a legislative ground swell to enact equality provisions.
This author has written elsewhere supporting the establishment of
Middle Eastern transboundary water commissions with which to build
trust and enhance water governance. 284 This Article is part of a series
that looks at environmental good governance and human rights. Ultimately, this author concludes here that there is not a magic scale of governance at which decisions will always be made in an environmentally
minded manner. International and national laws have the advantage of
being able to protect drinking water across a broad area for many people
and create a public health threshold, yet, such protections can be swept
away as easily as they can be created-if not more easily. There are
certainly individuals at a local level with a stake in ensuring the integrity
of local water supplies but without the constitutional support to prevent
commerce, in the form of drilling companies, from coming into their
local communities and engaging in business. Thus, the public health and
environmental integrity measures that should be well-established and
whose enforcement should be well funded, should be a cooperative commitment among all governance levels. This can involve clear roles for
each level-citizen monitoring and suits, tribal inclusive decision-making, municipal authority to zone residential areas that are free from industry and that can depend upon adequate water supplies, state statutes
and environmental regulations that ensure comprehensive environmental
and public health impact studies as well as enough boots on the ground
284 See, e.g., Elizabeth Burleson, Equitable and Reasonable Use of Water in the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin, 35 ENvrL. L. RieP. 10041, 10042 (2005); see also Elizabeth Burleson,
Middle Eastern and North African Hydropolitics: From Eddies of Indecision to Emerging
InternationalLaw, 18 Gro. INT'i ENvr. L. RFv. 385, 386 (2006).
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to monitor and enforce protection measures, and national drinking water
and environmental laws that indeed protect drinking water and ecosystem services.
So where do transboundary water organizations fit into this cooperative mix? Should they play the lead in authorizing energy extraction?
Should they receive the revenue derived from leasing fees for drilling?
Should they be able to permit drilling in a state that has a moratorium
preventing drilling? Should the governors of five states and a representative from the Army Corps of Engineers be able to take a single vote and
allow unconventional natural gas extraction in the watershed upon which
fifteen million people depend for clean drinking water? 28 5 If not these
six, then who? Civil society? 286 The legislature? The courts? The
EPA? Congress? The President? Who should make standards for drinking water? The Bill McKibben-inspired members of civil society willing
to get arrested for protesting at a DRBC meeting that would decide
whether hydrofracking would be permitted by the DRBC? Is this optimal public participation? Is it effective? Can it result in nuanced landuse regulation that balances private property rights with public health and
environmental integrity? 28 7 Is it worth paying attention when large numbers of people take to the streets? Having the social license to operate is
crucial, especially when something as vulnerable as a pipeline carrying
highly explosive gas is involved. This is the lesson learned by Shell in
Nigeria 288-(1) disenfranchised individuals can and will sabotage corporate profits when their family members become sick because their neighborhoods are no longer safe to live in due to air pollution from flaring
and water pollution, (2) public participation in decision-making is necessary, and (3) access to justice is important. To achieve these ingredients
of environmental justice, governments must establish laws that enhance
procedural rights; this would allow for civil society to genuinely achieve
informed consent, and thus have a meaningful input on draft legislation
and rule-making. Broad standing provisions also provide a check and
balance system with which to minimize the buying of politicians by cor285 See STATEIMPACt PA., supra note 168.
286 See generally VICTORIA B. BJORKLUND, JAMES FISHMAN & DANIFiL L. KURTZ, NEW
YORK NONPROFIr LAW AND PRACTICE WITH TAX ANALYSIS (2d ed. 1997) (providing a legal
analysis of non-profit law).

287 See Shelby D. Green, Reclaiming the Public Domain by Repeal of the Mining Law of
1872, 6 HOFSTRA PROP. L.J. 85 (1993); see also COMPENDIUM OF LAND USE LAWS FOR SusTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (John R. Nolon ed., 2006); JEFFREY MILLER, CITIZEN Surrs: PRIVATE
ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL POLLUTION CONTROL LAWS (1987); Karl S. Coplan, Ideological

Plaintiffs, Administrative Lawmaking, Standing and the Petition Clause, 61 ME. L. REV. 379
(2009); James May et al., Environmental Citizens Suits at Thirtysomething: A Celebration and
Summit, 33 ENvoL L. REP. 10721 (2003).
288 See, e.g., Pipeline Blown up in Niger Delta, BBC NEWS, May 26, 2008, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7419918.stm.
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porate interests. Safe drinking water and clean air are non-negotiable,

and corporations are not real people, yet public interests compete-affordable winter heating sources present a medical necessity as does having adequate funds with which to eat properly. These constraints are
clear, if often overlooked. Less clear to the general public are the intricacies of utility rate-making-the ability to raise the cost of natural gas or
electricity based on the cost of new infrastructure investment, for instance. Furthermore, the level of fossil fuel subsidization by the public
sector also remains opaque, as does the full life-cycle impact of the array
of available energy resources.
The United States' NEPA pioneered recognition of procedural
rights and, while it has not lived up to its full stature, it remains a useful
tool with which to insist that the federal government take stock of environmental impacts before proceeding with projects that impact public resources. Few little NEPA's at the state level have also allowed for
reflection periods prior to commencing projects that substantially impact
ecosystem services and environmental integrity. The environmental impact assessment requirements pioneered by the United States have spread
around the globe and become particularly effective in Europe. This author concludes that the United States could benefit by incorporating the
best practices being implemented by the European Union with regard to
environmental law generally and the Aarhus Convention in particular.
E. European Union as a Comparative Model for the United States
The Aarhus Convention has codified a human right to a clean environment; the convention grants citizens access to environmental information, participation in decision-making in environmental matters, and
judicial redress. 289 This convention picks up where the NEPA leaves off
by clearly delineating the scope of rights to (1) access to information, 290
(2) public participation in decision-making, 29 1 and (3) access to justice. 2 9 2 The body of cases that have developed pursuant to the Aarhus
Convention can facilitate energy/water/climate good governance wherever energy use impacts public health and environmental integrity. The
United States Congress should require gas companies to file quarterly
data reports with a federally and adequately funded clearinghouse of natural gas materials. 293 The Aarhus Convention provides a model with
289 See Convention On Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making
and Access to Justice Regarding Environmental Matters, art. 3, June 25, 1998, 38 1.L.M. 517
(1999), available at http://www.unece.org/env/pp/documents/cep43e.pdf [hereinafter Aarhus
Convention].
290 See id. art. 4.
291 See id. arts. 5-6.
292 See id. art. 9.

293 EPA and local communities could link websites with a single information portal.
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which to balance access to information with the administrative cost of
compliance. 294
Including citizens in environmental protection increases the effectiveness of that protection because people often have a deep interest in,
and are affected by, the state of their surrounding environment. 295 This
rights-based approach can prohibit discrimination on the basis of citizenship, nationality, or domicile. While the Convention is not focused on
the private sector, when environmental regulation has been devolved to
privatized bodies these entities are covered under the definition of public
authorities. 296
The RDSGEIS recognizes the lack of a US-based metric to evaluate
the environmental ramifications of various chemicals associated with unconventional natural gas extraction. In particular, it notes that the "most
significant environmentally conscious hydraulic fracturing operations
and regulations to date are likely in the North Sea. Several countries
have established criteria that define environmentally beneficial chemicals
and utilize models and databases to track chemicals' overall hazardousness against those criteria." 297
Several international best practices can inform genuine efforts to
minimize chemical exposure rates. First, the Oslo-Paris Convention
(OSPAR) list of environmentally sound chemicals can assist in minimizing exposure rates. 298 Second, the Norwegian Pollution Control Authority oil and gas industry chemical coding approach is capable of doing the
same. 299 Inclusive decision-making can lead to robust chemical approval
lists and lists of banned chemicals based on "low biodegradability; high
bioaccumulation potential; high acute toxicity; and detrimental mutagenic or reproductive effects."300
REACH also provides a best practice, demonstrating regulation of
the Registration, Evaluation, Authorization and Restriction of Chemical
Aarhus Convention, supra note 289.
See id.
296 See id. art. 2, § 2(b)-(c).
297 NE-W YORK RDSGEIS, supra note 133, at 9-10.

294 See
295

298 See The Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East
Atlantic, Sept. 9, 1992, available at http://www.ospar.org/html-documents/ospar/html/ospar..
convention-e-updated text_2007.pdf; see also OSPAR COMM'N, LIST o

SUBSTANCES OF

http://www.ospar.org/content/content.asp?menu=00950304450153_0000
00 000000 (last visited Oct. 10, 2012).
POSSIBLE CONCERN,

299 NORWEGIAN POLLUTION CONTROL AUTH., GuiDENE's To REGcULAIONs RELATING TO
CONDuCT

oi,

Ac-rivrnEs IN THE PEIROL EUM

§ 56(b) (2010); see also

Ac-ruvrriEs (rHE Acrivrins RiE-GuLATIONS)

CANADA-NEWFOUNDILAND

AND LABRADOR OFSHORE

PlTfROLEUM

Acrivi(2009), available at http://www.cnlopb.nl.ca/pdfs/guidelines/
ocsg.pdf (a North American model).
BOARO, OFFSHORE CHEMICAL SELECTION GuiDELINES FOR DRILLING & PRODUCTION

TIES

ON

FRONTIER

LANDS

300 JOINT COMMENTs, supra note 209, at 87.
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use in the European Union. 30' The European Commission explains that
"[m]anufacturers and importers are required to gather information on the
properties of their chemical substances, which will allow their safe handling, and to register the information in a central database run by the
European Chemicals Agency .... ."o2 The European Chemicals Agency
is establishing a robust public database for civil society to find hazard
information. 303
Europeans are familiar with difficult natural gas, energy, and security debates given the ongoing discord between Russia and much of the
rest of Europe that has resulted in winter home heating fuel insecurity.
The European Union seeks to reduce reliance on Russian natural gas supplies, particularly in the wake of Russia-Ukraine pricing conflicts that
resulted in supplies being halted to Western Europe in the winters of
2006 and 2009.304 While this has incentivized European exploration of
non-Russian energy alternatives, this energy insecurity has not kept
Europeans from implementing comprehensive environmental enforcement measures. 305
European Union pollution provisions provide broad energy-water
governance thresholds. 306 The plain language of the Mining Waste Directive 2006/21307 requires coordination with the Water Framework Directive 2000/60.308 The Water Framework Directive provides a best
practice upon which other jurisdictions can model water governance. 309
Together with the Ground Water Directive, baseline chemical thresholds, 3 10 transboundary coordination provisions, 3 1 1 and the Drinking
301 See Commission Regulation 1907/2006 (OJ.) (L 396) 1, 1 (EC) (entered into force on
June 1, 2007, and its provisions are being phased-in over eleven years); see also EUROPEAN
COMMIssION, REACH, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/chemicals/reach/reach-intro.htm
[hereinafter EuROPEAN COMMISSION, REACH] ("The REACH Regulation places greater re-

sponsibility on industry to manage the risks from chemicals and to provide safety information
on the substances.") (last visited Sept. 27, 2012).
302 EUROPEAN COMMISsIoN, REACH, supra note 301.
303 See id.
304 Russia Shuts Off Gas to Ukraine, BBC NEWS, Jan., I 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/

europe/7806870.stm (noting that, "[m]uch of the EU's gas from Russia arrives via Ukraine").
305 See, e.g.,

EUROPEAN

COMM'N,

EMISSIONS

TRADING

SYSTEM

(EU

ETS), http://

ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/indexen.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2012).
306 EUROPEAN

PARLIAMENT DIREICTORATE-GEN.

FOR

INTERNAL POLIcIES,

IMPACTS

SHALE GAS AND SHALE OIL. EXTRACTION ON THE ENVIRONMENT AND ON HUMAN HEALTH

OF

1,

55-57 (2011), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201107/20

I 10715A'T24183/20110715ATT24183EN.pdf.
307 Council Directive 2006/21, art. 2(l), 2006 O.J. (L 102) 15, 16 (EC).

30s Council Directive 2006/21, art. 5(2)(g), 2006 O.J. (L 102) 15, 22 (EC) (waste management plans are required to include "measures for the prevention of water status deterioration in
accordance with Directive 2000/60/EC . . ."); see also Council Directive 2000/60, 2000 (O.J.)
(L 327) 1 (EC).
309 See Council Directive 2000/60, art. 1(d), 2000 O.J. (L 327) 1, 5 (EC).
310 See Council Directive 2006/118, art. 3(2), 2006 O.J. (L 372) 19, 21 (EC).
311 See Council Directive 2006/118, art. 3(3), 2006 O.J. (L 372) 19, 21 (EC).
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Water Directive, 3 12 the Water Framework Directive can address important aspects of natural gas development. Drafters could enhance these
provisions to specifically respond to the unanticipated public health and
environmental integrity issues that come with hydraulic fracturing. The
Drinking Water Directive allows member states to exempt "water intended exclusively for those purposes for which the competent authorities are satisfied that the quality of the water has no influence, either
directly or indirectly, on the health of the consumers concerned . . . ."31
As a human-based standard, this may not adequately take into account
ecosystem services. Even within the context of the human-based approach, this may not protect drinking water, particularly for those relying
on wells. This is not solely a hydraulic fracturing issue. It is also a
matter of adequately regulating and monitoring such processes as cement
casing, flowback, and wastewater disposal. European Union Directive
2003/105/EC addresses large-scale hazardous material accidents, 3 14 and
the Hazardous Waste Directive (1991/689/EC) likely covers some aspects of unconventional natural gas extraction waste processes.3 15 Yet
this Article argues that unconventional extraction wastewater transport,
processing, and storage need to be specifically regulated. This can be
accomplished by amending existing water and energy directives or by
drafting a new unconventional extraction directive.
More recently, the European Union has modeled good governance
with strong procedural measures for access to information, public participation, and access to justice. For instance, the Environmental Assessment Directive 85/337 mandates environmental impact assessments for
public or private projects with significant environmental effects.3 16
Similarly, member states must disclose transboundary effects to
those impacted in as timely a manner as the citizens of the country carrying out the activity learn of the dimensions of the project.3 17 Given the
changes in hydraulic fracturing and modem extraction practices in residential areas, it behooves the European Union to reassess the thresholds
for the volume of natural gas extraction. 3 18
Biodiversity provisions can also help the European Union balance
energy production with public health and environmental integrity. For
instance, the Habitats Directive 92/43 protects endangered species and
312 See Council Directive 98/83, art. 1(2), 1998 O.J. (L. 330), 32, 34 (EC).

313 See Council Directive 98/83, art. 3(2)(a), 1998 O.J. (L. 330), 32, 34 (EC).
314 See Council Directive 96/82, art. 1, 2003 O.J. (L. 345), 1, 3 (EC).
315 See Council Directive 91/689, art. 1(1), 1991 O.J. (L. 377), 1, I (EEC).

316 Council Directive 85/337, art. 1(1), 1985 O.J. (L. 337), 1, 3 (EEC).
317 Council Directive 85/337, art. 7(1), 1985 O.J. (L. 337), 1, 7 (EEC).
318 See EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DIRECTORATE-GEN FOR INTERNAL POLICIES, supra note

306, at 78-79.

344

CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 22:289

the habitats upon which they depend. 3 19 While not all natural gas productions will impact endangered species or birds under the Birds Directive, 32 0 such nature-based provisions are part of the patchwork quilt of
existing provisions impacting natural gas production.
European Union climate/energy governance includes the Renewable
Energy Directive, Revised Emissions Trading Directive, Geological
Storage of Carbon Dioxide Directive, and Effort Sharing Decision that
together seek to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by twenty percent by
2020.321 Here, life-cycle analysis is crucial to determine whether the
leakage of natural gas, methane being a far more potent greenhouse gas
than carbon, is warranted when compared with the life-cycle of other
energy options.
As this article goes to press, recent European Union studies have
identified climate and health impacts of hydraulic fracturing and clarified
that the following directives may not fully cover unconventional natural
gas exploration: "Environmental Impact Assessment Directive (2011/92/
EU), the Environmental Liability Directive (2004/35/EC), the Mining
Waste Directive (2006/21/EC), and the Water Framework Directive
(2000/60/EC)" 322 The European Commission has announced that in
2013 the European Union will publish legislative proposals to ensure that
environmental law effectively covers shale gas extraction. 323
The flexibility of European Union directives provides member
states with the ability to tailor provisions to distinct geographic, cultural,
and other realities, while avoiding a race to the bottom with regard to
basic protections. It is fundamental to ensure a sound threshold at the
outset for such an approach to achieve "best practice" status. This requires meaningful involvement from a wide range of stakeholders to find
consensus regarding what constitutes safe thresholds.
CONCLuSION

Collaborative governance that is genuinely adaptive and cooperative
can best fill regulatory gaps. The best available science should guide
319 Council Directive 92/43, art. 2(1), 1992 O.J. (L. 206), 32, 34 (EEC).
320 See Council Directive 2009/147, art. 1(1), 2009 O.J. (L 20), 7, 8 (EC).
321 See Press Release, European Commission, The EU Climate and Energy Package,
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/package/index-en.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2012).
322 Stephen Gardner, Drilling European Union to Propose Legislation to Address Risks

from Hydraulic Fracturing,BNA, Sept. 14, 2012, http://news.bna.com/erln/ERLNWB/split
display.adpfedfid=27995824&vname=ernotallissues&jd=a0d4m7z9g4&split=0 (The study on
the climate impact of potential shale gas production in Europe is available at http://ec.europa.
eu/clima/policies/eccp/docs/120815_final report-en.pdf. The study on potential risks for the
environment and human health arising from hydrocarbon operations involving hydraulic fracturing in Europe is available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/integration/energy/pdf/fracking%20study.pdf.).
323 Id.

2012]

COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM AND HYDRAULIC FRACTURING

345

inclusive decision-making, and citizen suits should be authorized to give
members of civil society a compliance role that can balance the sway of
the energy sector on public sector decision-making.
The right to know which chemicals are likely to enter the drinking
supply as a result of unconventional natural gas development has caused
the most pronounced public outcry. Prior disclosure of chemicals across
the life cycle of natural gas development and wastewater disposal has yet
to be integrated into an adequate regulatory safety net for public health
and environmental integrity. Civil society is creating the checks and balances requisite to enact such protections in the United States-a legal
system susceptible to industry capture of elected officials. Civil society
would be able to play this role more effectively with access to information not only on the chemical composition of hydraulic fracturing solutions but also the radioactivity of wastewater flowback and alternatives,
ranging from the least toxic fracturing solutions to ways to minimize or
eliminate wastewater flowback. Environmental impact studies should
analyze these alternatives, providing the public real options with which
to balance economic and public health decisions.
Reclassifying floodplains to reflect the genuine risk of flooding has
caused less pronounced public outcry. Here, technical expertise is fundamental to informing energy siting decision-making. It makes little sense
to base permitting decisions on outdated floodplain maps when establishing regulations to protect drinking water. The Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC) indicates that wet places are receiving increased precipitation and that such places will increasingly need to respond to intense durations of heavy rainfall and flooding. 324 Updating
floodplain maps to reflect increased frequency and severity of precipitation can enhance the public sector's capacity to protect public health and
welfare.
Transboundary water organizations are in a position to show leadership by enhancing groundwater protection and being stewards of limited
freshwater supplies. This requires coordinated analysis on the energywater nexus-analysis that addresses the challenges of achieving energy/
water security as well as balanced domestic water use among stakeholders. Strong provisions for access to information, public participation,
and access to justice can facilitate procedural good governance with
which to ensure environmental and human health.
324 A stable climate is a public good, the absence of which will thwart the provision of
other public goods such as access to fresh water. The IPCC indicates that "[c]hanges in precipitation patterns and the disappearance of glaciers are projected to significantly affect water
availability for human consumption, agriculture and energy generation." INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, IPCC FOURTi AssEssMENT REPORT: CLIMATE CHANGE
2007, CLIMATE CHANGI

2007: SYNTHI-sis REPORT

§

3.3.2 (2007), available at http://www.

ipcc.ch/publicationsand-datalar4/syr/en/mains3-3-2.html.
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No single layer of government consistently provides optimal public
health and environmental integrity protections. At times, international,
non-governmental, regional, federal, state, local, and individual players
have provided sustainable development leadership. Some technologies
and geographic realities may be better suited to a given kind of governance. Regional water-energy-climate collaborative governance may facilitate wave energy success along a coastline. Similarly, watershed
management may benefit from regional transboundary commissions.
Yet such commissions will not, by definition, be insulated from persuasive and well-financed stakeholders seeking development permits that do
not adequately take into account water quality and quantity needs of the
watershed. Integrating the work of scholars conducting energy spectrum
life-cycle analysis with the work of scholars analyzing best practices in
collaborative governance continues to unfold. The national academies
and a wide range of public/private studies can further this crucial work.
In the context of unconventional natural gas, engineering, geology, innovation, and governance are colliding, and better water-energy-climate coordination can further energy security.
It is crucial that industry provide the funding with which to conduct
independent baseline assessments. The national academies should be involved in comprehensive evaluation of natural gas extraction as well as
cradle to grave analysis of respective energy options. Hydraulic fracturing, drilling, casement/cement stability, release/leakage of methane and
wastewater, and incentivizing green hydraulic fracturing solutions and
lowering water intensity of natural gas production are all areas needing
further analysis.
Hydraulic fracturing solutions vary from site to site given the range
of shale characteristics. People should be able to use information that is
put in the public domain that clearly identifies the range of chemicals
being used. Buffer zones should be placed around public drinking supplies. Permitting should not get out ahead of enforcement capacity. Industry fees should go towards public sector and independent, ongoing
water quality monitoring tests, both before and after industry activity.
These tests should be both onsite and downstream. Because all these
activities will cost money, proper funding for such initiatives is necessary. Fossil fuel extraction is a very lucrative industry, and it is prudent
to tie regulation fees to permitting application processes.
In addition to public sector regulation, corporate responsibility must
minimize the toxicity of operations and meaningfully disclose chemical
exposure. The private sector can provide leadership by highlighting environmentally sound best practices.
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Blowouts are not rare occurrences, and blowout preventers leave
much to be desired. 325 Comprehensive regulation that ensures well integrity should be informed by blowouts in Pennsylvania. Inadequate cementing and casing is dangerous and should be taken seriously as
unacceptable, whether in a backyard in Pennsylvania, in the Gulf of
Mexico, or in the Arctic Ocean. As the energy sector transitions from
traditional to unconventional energy explorationlexperimentation, safety
concerns intensify. Similarly, radioactive waste disposal capacity should
predate generation of radioactive waste, whether dealing with concentrated radioactive waste from nuclear power plants or radioactive shale
from natural gas wastewater.
Energy security and economic development are real drivers, as are
efforts to ensure affordable energy. Yet advances in drilling technology
should not be the only deciding factor in the absence of comparative lifecycle analyses across energy options. Transparency can help optimize
unconventional natural gas sustainable development. Jurisdictions
should analyze whether existing regulatory frameworks are adequate
since unconventional extraction is distinct from the conventional extraction for which existing regulations were designed. Innovation and deregulation have enabled unconventional natural gas extraction.
Congress should restore hydraulic fracturing and related activities to
federal environmental laws by passing the FRAC Act, closing loopholes,
and requiring chemical content disclosure. Genuine buffer zones should
be put in place for floodplains, all drinking water sources, and endangered species habitats. The EPA should enforce its prohibition on diesel
use in hydraulic fracturing and establish mandatory and frequent monitoring of aquifers and rivers downstream from natural gas production.
Permits should not be issued beyond regulatory capacity, and fees for
regulatory expenses should be substantial. Liability coverage should be
required and should be sufficient to make whole all people and ecosystems negatively impacted when regulations are not met.
Transitioning to environmentally sound energy use that minimizes
public health and environmental impacts while contributing to energy
security can best be done by looking to best practices throughout the
world. Best practices should be researched, published regularly, and included in mandatory employee training. Greenhouse gas vapor control
should be mandated and enforced.
One way to re-frame energy use and, by doing so, make energy
production more environmentally sound, is to coordinate water and en325 See Latham, supra note 20, at 37-38 (noting that "[m]ore than 100 blowout preventer
failures at eighty-three deepwater wells were studied, and fifty-seven percent were labeled
'safety critical failures"' and that there was "one blowout for every 387 wells drilled from
1992 through 2006.").
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ergy discussions. Recently, droughts and floods have compromised en-

ergy production. 326 This places water-energy-climate decision-making
in the public discourse, irrespective of efforts to discount climate trends
for lack of scientific certainty. By definition, scientific certainty will not
be achieved. This is why the international community committed to not
letting uncertainty stand in the way of addressing climate change in
agreeing upon the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change. 3 27
A social license to operate an activity as strategic and volatile as
natural gas extraction can be accomplished in combination with a robust
environmental and public health framework that balances energy and equity at local, regional, and international levels. Transboundary collaborative governance can help coordinate effective responses to shared
energy-climate-water challenges.

326 See Burleson, Emerging Law, supra note 201, at 503; N. AM. ELEC. REIuABIIrY
2012 SUMMER RELIABiILITY ASSESSMENT (May 2012), available at http://

CORP.,

www.nerc.com/files/2012SRA.pdf; see also Joe Eaton, Record Heat, Drought Pose Problems
for U.S. Electric Power, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC NEWS, Aug. 17, 2012, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2012/08/120817-record-heat-drought-pose-problems-for-electricpower-grid/.
327 See Intergovernmental Negotiating Comm. for a Framework Convention on Climate
Change, United Nations Framework on Climate Change, art. 3(3), 5th Sess., Annex, U.N.
Doc. A/AC.237/18 (Part II)/Add.1 (May 15, 1992) (UNFCCC) (one hundred sixty-five countries ratified the UNFCCC; the convention entered into force March 21, 1994); see also Elizabeth Burleson, Climate Change Consensus: Emerging International Law, 34 Wm. & MARY
ENvrt. L. & Pot'y REv. 543 (2010).

